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ABSTRACT 
This report sets out to determine if ubuntu can provide a principle of right 
action for business ethics and thereby to establish if the King III Report is 
indeed based on the “moral duties that find expression in the concept of 
ubuntu” as is claimed by the writers of King III. 
 
The report examines various aspects of ubuntu and shows that ubuntu is a 
normative ethical theory, arriving at the principle of right action that: “An 
action is right insofar as it promotes cohesion and reciprocal value amongst 
people.  An action is wrong insofar as it damages relationships and devalues 
any individual or group.” 
 
Finally, the report evaluates the King III Report on Corporate Governance 
2009.  It argues that there is some confusion in terminology.  The report 
finally demonstrates that the ethical values and moral duties laid down in 
King III largely do find expression in the concept of ubuntu. 
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Section 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Governance has become an essential element in all business 
transactions.  Not only has the large number of frauds, from Enron to 
Leisurenet to Bernie Madoff, focused the attention of the public on the way 
companies operate, but issues such as the recent banking crisis and the 
behaviour of global companies in terms of, inter alia, their environmental 
and labour practices, have led to the public questioning the most ethical 
way to run a business.  Internationally, various governments passed 
legislation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, or set up 
commissions to investigate and report on best ethical practice.  In the 
United Kingdom, the Cadbury Report on Corporate Governance was 
followed by the Greenbury, Hampel, Turnbull, Smith and Higgs reports, 
resulting in what is now called The Combined Code.  In South Africa, the first 
commission was constituted under the chairmanship of Judge Mervyn King 
in 1992.  This resulted in the first King Committee Report on Corporate 
Governance.  This was followed by King II and, in 2009, the third King 
Commission was established as a result of changes to the South African 
Companies Act (No. 71 of 2008) as well as emerging trends in governance 
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worldwide, producing The King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 
(King III)1 (King Committee 2009). 
 
King III states that the philosophy of the report revolves around leadership, 
sustainability and corporate citizenship.  The report then goes on to state 
that: 
Good governance is essentially about effective leadership.  Leaders 
should rise to the challenge of modern governance.  Such leadership 
is characterised by the ethical values of responsibility, accountability, 
fairness and transparency and based on moral duties that find 
expression in the concept of ubuntu.  (King III, p10) 
 
The term “ubuntu” has been used in South Africa, and in fact throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa, as defining how people and communities should 
behave in their interactions.  It has gained currency thanks to its use by 
Desmond Tutu (Tutu 1999) as well as a number of business leaders, 
academics and the Constitutional Court.  
                                                     
1
 The King Committee produced two documents, the King Report on Corporate Governance and the King 
Code of Governance Principles (essentially a summarised version of the Report).  This research refers 
to the King Report and will, hereafter, refer to this report as King III, followed by a page number where 
applicable. 
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The term "ubuntu" itself is derived from the prefix ubu- meaning “a 
collection or a group” and the suffix, -ntu, meaning “human” (van 
Binsbergen 2001, p53).  The word therefore means “collection of people”, 
or “humanness”, but its significance is far greater than that.  From a 
philosophical and ethical perspective, “ubuntu” has come to imply the 
relationships between people and how those relationships should be 
conducted.  In the context of this research report, the initial understanding 
will be that ubuntu is a proper means of establishing or determining the 
relationships between people, based on the aphorism that “a person is a 
person through other people”. 
 
 
Research Problem 
It is the intention of this research report to determine if ubuntu can yield an 
action-guiding principle of right action for business (and other uses) and 
then to establish if King III is indeed based on the “moral duties that find 
expression in the concept of ubuntu” (King III, p10). 
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This leads to the two sub-problems in this research report:   
 the first is to determine if ubuntu can provide an action-guiding 
principle of right action by which to evaluate Corporate Governance 
principles; and 
 the second is to establish whether the ethical and moral duties and 
values as laid down in King III actually do find expression in concept 
of ubuntu. 
 
In this report, I commence by examining the ethic of “ubuntu” with the 
intention of determining a principle of right action by which to evaluate the 
claim of King III.  After considering various aspects and attributes of ubuntu, 
based on the work of many authors, in particular the work of Thaddeus 
Metz, I finally establish a principle of right action based on ubuntu.  I then 
consider the views of the King III Report on Corporate Governance and try 
to evaluate what the authors of that report mean by ethical values and 
moral duties.  I arrive at the conclusion that there is some real confusion 
about the meaning of these terms.  King III regularly refers to stakeholders 
and, in order to establish how this may affect the concept of ubuntu, I 
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evaluate stakeholder theory in relationship to King III and ubuntu.  I then 
derive a heuristic, a procedure or set of rules, which allow us to evaluate 
actions as laid down in King III to determine if they reflect the ethical and 
moral values of ubuntu.  I conclude that it largely does, albeit that at times I 
had to tease out meaning due to the confusion about ethical values and 
moral duties. 
 
 
Importance 
There has been substantial debate (see below) on the actual meaning of 
“ubuntu” in ethical terms.  Not only has the term become part of the 
business community, as the numerous references testify, it has also been 
used several times in the Constitutional Court.2  However, at this stage, 
there seems to be no real principle of right action upon which to base any 
ethical decisions or to build a normative ethical framework.  The definitions, 
with few exceptions, refer to the evidence of ubuntu but not the moral 
reasoning supporting why ubuntu is exhibited.  To be able to address these 
                                                     
2 See the many discussions on various court cases in Cornell, D & Muvangua, N. eds., Ubuntu, and the Law 
in South Africa, Fordham University Press, Forthcoming (2010). 
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issues and come up with a definition of “ubuntu” which can actually be 
used as a maxim in deciding ethical issues would be of value to all South 
Africans. 
 
Secondly, if the King III and similar reports or ethical codes are to be 
effective in Africa they need to be “African”, as opposed to Eurocentric, in 
order to encourage adoption and acceptance by all sectors of the 
community.  West (2006, p441) states that “There is an incompatibility 
between …. aspects of African culture ….. and the Anglo-American 
corporate environment.”  Mogobe Ramose (2001, para. 8) also notes that 
“Similarly, law, to be worth its name and to command respect, must evince 
ubuntu.”  King III states that its Code is based on ubuntu.  I hope to establish 
that this is indeed the case, thereby validating King III as an appropriate 
code for use in (Southern) Africa and further encouraging its endorsement 
by all stakeholders in the business community. 
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Section 2 
UBUNTU AS A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT ACTION 
“Ubuntu” has been defined by many commentators, yet it seems that the 
essence of the term is still lacking.  Certainly, it is difficult to take any one of 
the “definitions” and use it to create a principle-based theory of right action 
applicable in a business situation, which is the focus of this report. 
 
I will first consider the various descriptors of ubuntu, the terms used to 
describe the evidence of ubuntu, rather than ubuntu itself.  I then evaluate 
King III’s definition of ubuntu before considering other possible 
interpretations such as the golden rule or a Kantian dignity perspective.  
Finally, I use the work of Thaddeus Metz to develop a principle of right 
action based on ubuntu. 
 
The need to develop a principle of right action arises because we require a 
foundation from which to determine if King III is based on the principles of 
ubuntu.  It will not help to state, for example, that ubuntu implies my 
humanity intertwined with my community, as that does not provide a 
means to evaluate the claims of King III.  What is needed is an action-
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guiding principle as the yardstick by which to measure the moral values and 
ethical duties in King III.  The problem that we face is that numerous 
authors write about ubuntu, but do not treat it as a principle of right action.  
There is also a wide variety of interpretations as to what ubuntu means.  
Most people write about the evidence of ubuntu, but very few on the rule 
of ubuntu. 
 
Ubuntu Descriptors 
Desmond Tutu (Tutu 1999, pp34-35) states that “Ubuntu … speaks of the 
very essence of being human”.  According to Tutu, ubuntu says “I am human 
because I belong.  I participate, I share.”  We can relate to this, I think; it 
seems to resonate, but this does not provide me with a guideline as to how 
to act in all situations as does, say, the Kantian Categorical Imperative.  
Augustine Schutte (Shutte 2001) argues that people only exist in relation to 
others and in relationship with others and that this is the essence of 
ubuntu.  He argues that “living in the spirit of UBUNTU is not just a 
conventional obligation.  It is my very growth as a person that is at stake.  It 
is a matter of life and death.”  (Shutte 2001, pp23-24).  So we can 
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understand from Schutte that ubuntu is the spirit, the “glue” that binds us 
together, but how does it help me to make an ethical decision?   
 
Similarly, Ramose (1999), argues that being human is to affirm one’s 
humanity by recognising the humanity of others.  He states that “Ubuntu 
understood as be-ing human (human-ness) …. constitutes the core meaning 
of this aphorism [umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu – the phrase defining the 
concept of ubuntu+” (Ramose 1999, p52).  It is being human which identifies 
ubuntu.  I believe there is merit in this recognition of others’ humanity, and 
have tried to incorporate the concept in my own definition, but it is not 
sufficient on its own – how does a recognition of others’ humanity lead to 
an action-guiding principle, which is what ubuntu must be? 
 
Eygelaar (1998, p159) also observes that “Although ubuntu literally means 
African humanism, it shares values with the human race in general.  Values 
such as respect, dignity, empathy, co-operation and harmony between 
members of society are not exclusively African, but comprise the human 
race as a whole.”  Similarly, Le Roux says that if people possess ubuntu they 
will have characteristics such as being “caring, humble, thoughtful, 
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considerate, understanding, wise, generous, hospitable, socially mature, 
socially sensitive, virtuous and blessed” (Le Roux, 2000, p. 43).  And Reuel 
Khoza (Khoza 2006) states that ubuntu is characterised by a range of values 
such as caring, reciprocity, sharing, compassion, hospitality, cohabitation, 
cooperation and tolerance. 
 
So many authors give lists of characteristics but no ground rules as to why 
these characteristics and not others constitute ubuntu.  They seem no 
different to any religious framework, to any other set of values.  Numerous 
other authors try to describe what it is, if anything, that differentiates 
ubuntu from conventional western philosophical (and ethical) thought.3  
However, in my view, I could find nothing in their writing that allows me to 
use ubuntu as an action guiding principle of right action.4  There is little 
guidance on how to decide when facing difficult moral decisions, such as 
how to arbitrate between the interests of the various business stakeholders, 
or how fairly to allocate resources.  There is an ideal, an objective, which 
                                                     
3
 See for example  Bewaji & Ramose (2003), Bodunrin (1981), Brack, Hill, Edwards, Grootboom & Lassiter 
(2003), Enslin & Horsthemke (2004), Iroanya (2005), Karsten & Illa (2005, 2001), Mnyaka & Motlhabi 
(2005) , Mudimbe (1985) and Versi (1998). 
4
 Recently Broodryk published an “Ubuntu Pledge” (Broodryk 2010, p68) which sets out a list of what 
could be defined as right actions (be good, live honestly, etc.) but there is still no underlying principle 
of right action.   
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says that we are to behave in such a manner that builds and sustains 
relationships, but how exactly we are to do this remains an issue.  This is 
not to say that the various eminent writers on ubuntu are wrong; it is 
merely that they are writing about the essence of ubuntu, the evidence of 
ubuntu and not attempting to create a philosophical principle.  I am thus 
left with the question: What exactly is the action guiding principle of 
ubuntu? 
 
At this point, having considered the various (unhelpful) definitions and 
attribute lists discussed above, and the many more throughout my survey 
of the ubuntu literature5 it seems that ubuntu is either a more or less 
vacuous noun, or a kind of vague guideline about how to carry ourselves or 
a kind of normatively-charged idea of the essence of humanness.6  What we 
do not have is a principle of right action.  The majority of ubuntu literature 
does not appear to regard ubuntu as a principle of right action but rather as 
an ethical concept.  However, it is important, for my intention to evaluate 
the ethical and moral values in King III and to test for compliance with 
                                                     
5
 No survey of literature can be all encompassing and there is, no doubt, literature which may address my 
concerns.  However, I did not find this in my searching. 
6
 I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr Brian Penrose, for this comment in his review of an earlier draft. 
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ubuntu, that I have a principle of right action as my yardstick.  This is what is 
developed below. 
 
Furthermore, it is essential to evaluate whether ubuntu is an ethical 
construct, which provides a unique (partially, at least) principle of right 
action, or a mere restatement or translation of extant rules or principles of 
right action.  If it is the latter, we cannot readily establish if King III is indeed 
based on the moral duties that find expression in ubuntu, because there 
would be none. 
 
There are four possible interpretations of the ubuntu principle that require 
consideration before I attempt to develop a principle of right action.  The 
first is the definition as expressed in King III, which describes ubuntu as 
"humaneness"; the second is that ubuntu is a restatement of the Biblical 
golden rule – “Love your neighbour as you love yourself”; the third is that 
ubuntu is a variant of dignity and therefore Kantian in essence; and the 
fourth is the view proposed by Thaddeus Metz that “An action is right just 
insofar as it promotes shared identity among people grounded on good-
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will; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to do so and tends to 
encourage the opposites of division and ill-will.” (Metz 2007a, p338). 
 
Ubuntu and King III 
Ubuntu in King III is defined as follows: "Simply put, Ubuntu means 
humaneness and the philosophy of Ubuntu includes mutual support and 
respect, interdependence, unity, collective work and responsibility.  It 
involves a common purpose in all human endeavour and is based on service 
to humanity (servant leadership).”  (King III, p23). 
 
With due respect to the eminent writers of the report I am again left with a 
list of characteristics.  In the first instance, ubuntu has to do with the 
relationship between the individual and the group.  Even the translation 
provided by King III “I am because you are; you are because we are” (King 
III, p23) implies this.  There is nothing to suggest that ubuntu means 
“humaneness”, even if caring, compassion and benevolence, the hallmarks 
of humaneness, are also characteristics of ubuntu.  I do not disagree with 
King III that the spirit of ubuntu includes mutual support and respect, that 
in ubuntu there is interdependence amongst people and a striving for unity.  
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I can also accept that there should be mutual responsibility.  I do not know 
what is meant by "collective work" other than some form of communalism, 
which, while espoused in much of the literature on “African” ethics, is a pale 
shadow of what I believe is meant by ubuntu. (Refer to my discussions 
below on the golden rule and later in articulating my principle of right 
action.)  I could not find support in the literature for the concept that 
ubuntu is based on service to humanity or servant leadership, as stated in 
King III.  I am not even sure what is meant by “service to humanity”.  
Accordingly, while King III provides a description of what the writers believe 
to be the attributes of ubuntu, essentially this definition is little different to 
the many definitions above and we cannot use it to evaluate the moral 
rightness of actions. 
 
Ubuntu and the Golden Rule 
There is a sizable body of literature that considers ubuntu from a religious 
perspective.  While not all of it is specific, it is possible to propose that “A 
person is a person because of other people” is akin to the golden rule “Love 
your neighbour as you love yourself” in that ubuntu is obviously concerned 
with the relationship between people; it is concerned with community and 
15 
 
the role of the individual within that community.  “Love your neighbour” is 
certainly a way of maintaining relationships within a community.  In 
discussing ubuntu and community, Tshawane (2009, p78) observes that: 
“human relations have their grounding and validity in the person of God, 
which are manifested through love for the neighbour.”  Michael Battle, too, 
makes the following observation about the work of Desmond Tutu:   
From this African worldview, Ubuntu shaped Tutu’s subsequent work 
as the centre from which to make racial reconciliation 
comprehensible in the African culture.  Tutu needed to communicate 
at this level because interdependence is necessary for people to 
exercise, develop, and fulfil their potential to be both individuals and 
a community.  Only by means of absolute dependence on God and 
neighbour – including both Blacks and Whites – can true human 
identity be discovered.  Indeed, such human interdependence is built 
into our very own creation by our being created in God’s image, our 
common Imago Dei (in Daye, 2004, p161).  
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While not specifically addressing the golden rule here, it is obviously the 
basis for Tutu’s comment.  Indeed Tutu (1994, p70) states that every person 
must love God and his neighbour as well. 
 
More clearly, Koka (2000) says: 
…the humanness that I share with others makes me conscious of the 
reality that in my essential being I depend on the essential 
“beingness” of the other.  This instils in me an awareness of the other 
person who is my counterpart in society.  This creates in me a feeling 
that “being for- other” appears to be a necessary condition for being 
for myself.  In this respect, the concept of Ubuntu becomes the basis 
of the major commandment of life: “Love their neighbour as 
themselves” (Koka 2000, p44) 
 
As Wiredu (2005, p.117) notes: “It is not surprising that many, possibly all, 
cultures are known to settle for some such principle as what, in Western 
culture, is called the Golden Rule.”  Sundermeier (1998, p174) also says that 
“In this light, it becomes obvious why in African society ethics can be 
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regarded as being grounded on one key principle - respect for and right 
relationship with the neighbour”. 
 
It seems, therefore, that there is support for the “Golden Rule” view of 
ubuntu.  However, we need to understand what exactly this implies for our 
search for an action-guiding principle of right action based on ubuntu. 
 
Drucilla Cornell (2010, p 372) states that in defining ubuntu one could say “I 
am your friend because I am a friend to myself, as a being who can make 
himself or herself a person who struggles to make what I am who I should 
be.”  Taking this further and invoking Kant, whom I shall discuss below, she 
says “We could rephrase the Kantian language of friendship through ubuntu 
as follows: In Kant, I am a friend to myself because of the dignity of my 
humanity.  Under ubuntu, I am a friend to myself because others in my 
community have already been friends to me” (Cornell, 2010, p 373).  It 
seems that Cornell, albeit not overtly, is reading “a person is a person 
through other people” through golden rule glasses.  The concept of the 
friendship between us being reliant on my friendship with myself is much 
closer to “love your neighbour as you love yourself” than I believe was 
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intended by ubuntu.  Ubuntu is an acknowledgement that one’s very 
existence is tied up in the wider community.  As Lovemore Mbigi states: 
“Ubuntu is the essence of being human, and is a positive perception of 
African personhood.  It refers to the collective interdependence and 
solidarity of communities of affection.”  (Mbigi 2005, p 69).  
 
It could be argued that “Love your neighbour” is focused on the immediate 
community (your neighbour), whereas ubuntu is concerned with all people.  
However, it seems as if that was not the intention behind the golden rule 
and, when asked “Who is my neighbour?”, Jesus responded with the Good 
Samaritan parable7 indicating that neighbour indeed applied to all people.   
 
Kwasi Wiredu (Wiredu, 2005) states that morality seeks to harmonize the 
interests of the individual with those of the community.  He says that “to 
live in a society is, in general, to have some conception of other selves in 
contrast to oneself.  At the minimum, this involves having a sense of one’s 
own interests in relation to the interests of others.  It involves also, beyond 
                                                     
7
 It is interesting to note that the origin of “Love your neighbour” comes from the Old Testament book of 
Leviticus (Ch19 v18) and in those times would certainly have only referred to the Jewish or Israeli 
people.  When this was discussed in the parable of the good Samaritan, Gospel of Luke (Ch10 v20-37), 
the concept was expanded to the neighbour being the one who showed mercy, implying that we are all 
neighbours to each other. 
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this, some sense of the need to harmonize these interests, which, by any 
account, are apt frequently to conflict.”  (Wiredu 2005, p117).  He states 
elsewhere (Wiredu 2008, p334) that: “*The Golden Rule+ is, in fact, a global 
principle.  The analogy between this principle and the principle underlying 
African communitarianism consists in the fact that the latter also is the 
quest for the adjustment of certain special interests of the individual to 
those of the community.”  But Wiredu here also is making the interpretation 
too parochial in the sense that it is imposing limits on the scope of ubuntu.  
The golden rule (as with ubuntu) should be seen to apply to all ethical 
decisions made by all people at all times if it is to be a principle of right 
action.  While there may be disagreement about this issue, it seems correct 
to me that a principle of right action, as far as possible, must have universal 
applicability to all people at all times, otherwise I think we arrive at either a 
selective morality or some form of cultural morality, neither of which seem 
appropriate to me. 
 
The problem, in my view, is not that the application of the golden rule is too 
communitarian - that we can overcome - but that it is too loosely worded 
for practical action without being further expounded.  For example, how 
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would one use the golden rule to punish a criminal?  Clearly, loving 
punishment is moving toward being an oxymoron.  How does one apply the 
golden rule in business when needing to fire or retrench someone, 
especially if one is keeping one’s own job?8  Does the golden rule also apply 
in the distribution or redistribution of wealth - and whose wealth, mine or 
my neighbour’s?  Other issues arise.  Do I render assistance to a stranded 
motorist specifically with the thought that I anticipate them doing the same 
for me?  Furthermore, what if I do not love myself, how then do I treat 
people?  The golden rule seems to maintain a tension, a demand for 
equality, between individuality and community which I do not see to the 
same extent in ubuntu.  In ubuntu, in my view, my entire existence is 
dependent on community; I am absorbed into community and have no real 
existence without it (nor it without me, in the sense that a community 
comprises individuals).  As Tomaselli (Tomaselli 2009, p584) observes, 
ubuntu “is thus distinguished from Eurocentric concepts in that it 
supposedly elevates the community above the Self.” 
                                                     
8
 It has been observed by the external examiner of this report that it could be argued that the golden rule 
can be used with regard to the punishment of a criminal in that, “if I had committed the self-same 
crime I would expect to be punished in the self-same way.  In other words I am doing to you what I 
would like you to do to me when the shoe is on the other foot.”  I accept that this could be a view, but I 
think it is more akin to the adage “Do to others what you would have them do to you” than to “Love 
your neighbour as you love yourself”. 
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With regard to the term “community”, it is appropriate here to consider my 
sense of what it means.  At a macro level, community to me includes all 
humanity.  However, I do understand that those people with whom I am in 
relationship – at whatever level – are a closer community than those whom 
I have never encountered.  I believe that our action guiding principle should 
apply to all people, all humanity, at all times.  It is only that in giving 
expression to the principle that we will obviously be more concerned with 
our immediate community than those further away, whether that is 
geographically or socially. 
 
One final comment on the golden rule has to do with supererogatory acts.  
It is my understanding of ubuntu, based on much reading and many 
discussions, that giving, in all its senses, with no anticipation of any benefit 
to oneself, is expected, as long as the community benefits, even if this is to 
the possible detriment of the actor – the real essence of supererogation.  
However, in Roman Catholic tradition, acts of supererogation create a 
“merit fund” which can be drawn against to aid sinners.  This sense of 
supererogatory would seem foreign to some proponents of ubuntu, 
22 
 
although it has been suggested9 that in some traditional conceptions of 
ubuntu a supererogatory act would gain “life force” for the giver. 
 
Thus, while there are elements of the golden rule in ubuntu, and vice versa, 
the differences between the two concepts mean that I must pursue a 
different interpretation and further development of ubuntu before I can 
achieve a principle of right action. 
 
 
Ubuntu and Dignity – Kant, von Pufendorf and Cicero 
There is a school of thought, largely in the legal fraternity10 in South Africa, 
that seems to regard ubuntu as allied to or a version of Kant’s dignity.  As 
observed by Cornell and Mavungua (2010) “The relationship between 
ubuntu and dignity must be recognized, as they both have come to play an 
important role in the jurisprudence of the new South Africa, which is both 
rich and generative.”  (Cornell & Mavungua 2010, p7).  Similarly, Woolman 
(2009) observes that “For both the drafters of the Final Constitution and for 
                                                     
9
 This was suggested by the external examiner of this report.  It is an area which requires further 
investigation. 
10
 Refer especially to the extensive discussion on this aspect in Woolman (2009) which, for purposes of 
focus, I have not included here. 
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Kant, the ideal basic law attempts to give adequate effect to three 
sometimes covalent, sometimes conflicting 'ideas': dignity, equality and 
freedom.”  (Woolman 2009, p2)   
 
Kant’s “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at 
the same time as an end” (Kant, 1785 p 429) is tied to Kant’s belief that 
individuals have inherent or intrinsic worth, or, to use Kant’s term, 
“absolute value” merely because they are rational beings.  From this then 
comes the concept of human dignity, the basis for how people are to treat 
one another in the Kingdom of Ends.  Kant’s concept of worth is that it is 
intrinsic to all rational beings and is unconditional, distinctive and objective.  
It is this worth that Kant calls “dignity” and it is possessed by all “ends” 
which are themselves, “an object of respect”.  (Kant 1785, p 428). 
 
Ramose (2001) supports this view of dignity when he says that: “Umuntu, a 
human being in the biological sense, is enjoined to become a human being 
proper by embracing ubuntu.  Umuntu must be the embodiment of ubuntu 
because the fundamental ethical, social and legal judgement of human 
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dignity and conduct is based upon ubuntu.”  (Ramose 2001, para. 8).  
Poovan, du Toit and Engelbrecht (2006), observe that in discussing ubuntu 
with factory workers the concept of dignity is important.  They comment 
that “Dignity is related to respect and is created through one’s behaviour, 
for example, one’s interaction with others.  Participants expressed the belief 
that respect and dignity are important values of ubuntu” (Poovan et al 
2006, p24).  Similarly, Cornell and Muvanga note that: “Both Dignity and 
ubuntu are integrally tied to an ethical ideal of what it means to be a 
human being, and therefore one would expect that there is a resonance 
between the two”.  (Cornell & Muvanga 2010, p7).  
 
In my understanding of ubuntu, I believe that the concepts implied by 
dignity are important to our understanding of ubuntu, but I also believe that 
beyond this “dignity” is the concept of “humanity”.  In other words, while I 
concur with the Kantian view that “all value comes from humanity”; that we 
- and all other rational beings - have ultimate value, I do not like Kant’s term 
“dignity”.  I want something more encompassing.  At issue, for me, is the 
semantics of “dignity”, not so much Kant’s concept of intrinsic worth.  
However, it seems to me that the usual meaning of the word “dignity” - the 
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quality of being worthy or honourable, noble or excellent; behaving with 
decorum (The Oxford English Dictionary, 1971) – is what is now, erroneously 
in my view, being interpreted as Kant’s meaning.  One reads that we must 
treat people with dignity, with respect.  This is surely not what Kant 
intended.  Words like “worth” or “value” are much more in line with Kant’s 
meaning.  However, I also have a problem with “dignity” if it merely signifies 
worth.  It seems to me that being worthy implies a state that has been 
earned by heroic actions, supererogatory acts, or great moral deeds.  In my 
experience, there are very few people who are worthy or honourable or 
who exhibit worthiness, worth, nobleness or excellence.  In fact, on the 
contrary, most people fall short of these ideals.  What am I then to say?  Is 
no one of value?  Are just some people of value?  Of course not, but the 
value does not lie in the dignity or worthiness of a person, it lies merely in 
the fact that a person is part of humanity.  My contention is that Ubuntu 
does not rely on people being worthy but merely on a person being a 
person whose “personhood” is validated within the context of relationship 
with all other people.  It seems to me that this goes beyond Kant in that to 
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him to be of value you had to be a rational human being.  Ubuntu applies 
even to the numerous irrational human beings surrounding us.11 
 
It has been argued by Ramose (2001) who states that “a human being in the 
biological sense, is enjoined to become a human being proper by embracing 
ubuntu.”  (Ramose 2001, para. 8).  The implication of this is that not all 
humans are persons and that they only gain “personhood” by embracing 
ubuntu.  The implications of this concept are vast, and require further 
thought and investigation.  For example, if I do not consider that you have 
embraced ubuntu do I have the right to treat you as a “non-person”?  My 
sense is that this would be an inappropriate interpretation, but the 
question, at this stage, is beyond the scope of this report.12 
 
I also believe that ubuntu goes beyond not treating people as a means and 
is more focused on treating people as ends at all times.  In my view there 
are obligations inherent in ubuntu, obligations to act positively as opposed 
to not negatively.  The legal profession seem in no doubt that there are 
                                                     
11
 There are two ways to interpret this concept of irrational.  In terms of normal usage many people are 
irrational.  In Kantian terms it had to do with having full mental faculties, having the mental inability to 
be rational or not. 
12
 This line of thought was suggested by the external examiner of this report. 
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duties and responsibilities inherent in ubuntu.  Narnia Bohler-Muller, in 
discussing the law and ubuntu notes that “The idea that law experienced by 
an individual within the group is bound to individual duty as opposed to 
individual rights or entitlement should be advanced.  (Bohler-Muller 2005, 
p80).  This view is shared by Justice Lange when, in commenting on ubuntu, 
he states that "The person has a corresponding duty to give the same 
respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community.  
More importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays 
on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.”  
(Lange, S v Makwanyane, paras. 224-225).  This seems appropriate.  It is 
hardly reasonable to imaging a situation where people enjoy rights without 
responsibilities, and an ubuntu-based society could hardly be otherwise.  It 
should also be observed that these responsibilities are positive duties. 
 
This is Metz’s view, and he observes that: “the most promising way to 
construct a competitive African moral theory is to develop Tutu’s 
understanding of ubuntu in terms of a basic obligation to promote 
harmonious relationships and to prevent discordant ones.”  (Metz 2007a, 
p341).  Metz is convinced that relationship and harmony are important to 
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ubuntu and, in replying to his critics, comments that: “One could also 
suggest a more explicitly expressive version of the principle, so that one's 
basic obligation is to prize harmony or to show respect for it.  (Metz 2007c, 
p374).  Again, this obligation is positively structured.  It is not that we must 
not harm relationships; it is that we must build them. 
 
Is the obligation, the duty, the responsibility unique to the law or 
relationship building?  I think not.  Reading all the definitions of “ubuntu” 
the one common thread that appears everywhere is the sense that there is 
mutual obligation to “do good” to others as opposed to “not doing evil”.  
This is obviously not unique to ubuntu, and I accept that Kant has stressed 
that there are imperfect duties, which include positive obligations.  
However, I do not believe that these positive duties in Kant are as explicit as 
they are in ubuntu.  As Metz notes, “The requirements of an individual to 
help others are typically deemed heavier in African morality than in 
Western.  A greater percentage of Africans think that one is morally 
obligated to help others.”  (Metz 2007a, p236).  To this extent I believe that 
ubuntu differs from Kant, in that the action-guiding principle that I seek in 
ubuntu will not be found in Kant. 
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Kant's predecessor, Samuel von Pufendorf13, in his seminal The Whole Duty 
of Man According to the Law of Nature (1735) discusses the concept of 
dignity as it relates to equality amongst people.  He states: 
There seems to him to be somewhat of dignity in the appellation of 
man: so that the last and most efficacious argument to curb the 
arrogance of insulting men is usually, I am not a dog, but a man as 
well as yourself.  Since then human nature is the same in us all, and 
since no man will or can cheerfully join in society with any, by whom 
he is not at least to be esteemed equally as a man, and as a partaker 
of the same common nature: it follows that, among those duties 
which men owe to each other, this obtains the second place, that 
every man esteem and treat another as naturally equal to himself, or 
as one who is a man as well as he.  (von Pufendorf 1735, p97). 
Haakonssen (2010) observes that this “equality “is not von Pufendorf's 
belief that all men are equal, but that all men have some inherent value.  In 
the passage quoted he uses the term “dignitas”, but later changes to 
                                                     
13
There is much value to be gained in reading this work and seeing how much of the ubuntu concept is 
included in von Pufendorf's work.  In his views on our duties to others he essentially notes that the 
absolute duties owed by people to each other that we avoid wronging others, promote the good of 
others and that we treat people as equals, all of which resonates with ubuntu. 
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“existimatio” which, over time and various translations has been rendered 
as “esteem”, “regard”, or “standing” (which refer to my discussion on dignity 
and value above and later).  It this “existimatio” which von Pufendorf 
attributes to the value of persons. 
 
The point about von Pufendorf's dignity is not that he considers all people 
inherently equal in “existimatio”, but that it is a duty to consider all men of 
equal regard or value.  This is in contrast to ubuntu, where there is 
recognition of an intrinsic worth in each person, without this recognition 
being a duty - it is a “fact”. 
 
We can finally14 turn to Cicero, as quoted by Martha Nussbaum, where 
Cicero states: “If nature considers that a human being should consider the 
interests of a human being, no matter who he is, just because he is human, 
it is necessary that according to nature what is useful for all is something in 
common.  And if this is so, then we are all embraced by one and the same 
law of nature....” (Nussbaum, p184).  It seems to me that this is closest to 
my view of the inherent value of each human being that I see in ubuntu.  I 
                                                     
14 This brief excursion was brought about by trying to find a source or alternative for Kant's “dignity”.  It 
led to von Pufendorf and Cicero and has no doubt omitted many of their successors and antecedents. 
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discuss this further below, but want to observe that in my view ubuntu 
values human beings qua human beings, they have intrinsic value.  Cicero 
seems to have the same view, but still only deals with how we treat people 
(consider their interests) and not how we regard people, which I believe 
goes beyond considering their interests and I think those are two different 
states. 
 
Metz on Ubuntu 
Thaddeus Metz (Metz 2007a, p338) comes closest to establishing a formal 
rule-based definition of “ubuntu” when he states that “An action is right 
just insofar as it promotes shared identity among people grounded on 
good-will; an act is wrong to the extent that it fails to do so and tends to 
encourage the opposites of division and ill-will.”   
 
However, I disagree with Metz over various aspects of this definition, the 
first area being to do with good will.  Metz states that:  “One has a 
relationship of good-will insofar as one: wishes another person well 
(conation); believes that another person is worthy of help (cognition); aims 
to help another person (intention); acts so as to help another person 
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(volition); acts for the other’s sake (motivation); and, finally, feels good 
upon the knowledge that another person has benefited and feels bad upon 
learning she has been harmed (affection).”  Metz (2007a, p336). 
 
In Metz’s view, it is by exhibiting this good will that one builds and 
strengthens relationships.  I take issue with his opinion that the person 
must be (perceived to be) worthy of help in order to receive help.  My sense 
of ubuntu is that it applies to everyone, irrespective of merit.  If merit were 
a criterion, there are very few people worthy of help.  I have discussed this 
in detail in my discussion on “value” elsewhere, so will merely observe that 
my view of ubuntu is that everyone is worthy of help by their mere 
existence. 
 
The second concern I have is that Metz has brought in a strong Kantian 
element by his use of the term “good-will”.  Johnson (2008) notes that Kant 
seems to regard the most important attribute an individual can have is good 
will.  In this sense, a person has value, or is good, because they have the will 
to do good and because they exercise that will to do good (or the right 
moral action) on the basis of a duty to obey moral law.  It is this “good will” 
33 
 
to obey a moral law because of duty rather than for any other reason, such 
as self-interest, that Kant seems to believe creates the value of a person.  I 
consider that to the extent that there are such philosophical undertones 
inherent in the term “good-will” it is an inappropriate term to use in the 
context of ubuntu. 
 
Secondly, I take issue with the concept of a “shared identity”.  Too often 
that term implies segregation of people into groups or categories – we have 
a “shared identity” because we are English speakers, because we are black 
Xhosa people, because we come from the same town, etc.  Rather than 
promoting universal acceptance or understanding, such a concept is too 
parochial with potential undertones of racism or sectarianism.  Now it 
seems that Metz has a different view.  He states (Metz 2007a, P335) that 
harmony involves a sense of self which implies that the individual considers 
himself part of a group; that the group considers the individual part of the 
group; that the people in the group have common ends; and that the group 
acts to give effect to those common ends.  Metz accepts that it is hard to 
see how such shared identity has a moral value and thus places this shared 
identity in the context of good will.  Here, actions undertaken by and on 
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behalf of the group are based on good will, as opposed to any other 
motivation.  For the reasons cited above I remain convinced that shared 
identity is too heavily laden with undertones and I would far rather use the 
term “shared humanity”, which is substantially more neutral and broader in 
its application. 
 
Finally, there is a distinct element of “individual-ness” which I believe is 
lacking in Metz’s definition.  Ubuntu is about both people as individuals as 
well as people in the wider society.  There is no mention of the individual at 
all in Metz’s definition and, in developing his ubuntu principle Metz 
observes that “A different understanding of the morality of ubuntu includes 
the idea that moral value fundamentally lies not in the individual, but rather 
in a relationship between individuals.”  (Metz 2007a, P333).  I believe this 
flies in the face of ubuntu, which I contend has a strong individualistic 
element as well.  It appears to me that while the group, the community, is 
extremely important in ubuntu, there is nothing I can find in the literature 
that makes group interests of greater value than the individual.  At all times 
it seems to me that both the individual and the group are of equal value, 
especially if one considers that a group is comprises individuals. 
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While I consider Metz’s definition of ubuntu to be the most coherent and 
logical thus far, on the basis of the arguments presented above I believe we 
have to rebuff or amend Metz’s definition.  This I attempt to do below. 
 
Perhaps the essence of the debate on Ubuntu is summed up by Lovemore 
Mbigi (Mbigi, 2005, p112) when he says that “It will not be enough for 
Africans to state that their philosophy is a social, communitarian one.  The 
challenge lies in our ability as Africans to translate this perspective into an 
enviable, organised, disciplined and prosperous way of modern life, 
characterised by justice and the establishment of sustainable, fair 
communities in which all ethnic groups and their aspirations can find a 
home.”  This is the basis of the definition to which I aspire. 
 
 
The Principle of Ubuntu 
My preliminary ubuntu principle of right action, at an earlier stage of my 
research, was: “An action is right insofar as it promotes cohesiveness and 
mutual respect amongst people.” 
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In this definition I wanted to include community, which I tried to do with 
the word “cohesiveness”.  I also wanted to deal with the relationship 
between individuals and for this purpose included the term “mutual 
respect”.  However, the term “respect” smacks of dignity and I want to 
avoid that or similar terms for the reasons cited above. 
 
I have therefore arrived at a reworked statement of the principle: 
“An action is right insofar as it promotes cohesion and reciprocal value 
amongst people.  An action is wrong insofar as it damages relationships and 
devalues any individual or group.” 
 
I have tried to avoid the term “community” as I fear that this may restrict 
the applicability of the ubuntu to a group or collection of people – it must 
be greater than our local community and should essentially refer to all 
humanity.  However, it would be naïve to think that an action affects the 
entire human race and I have thus used the term “people” rather than, for 
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example, “humanity”, as I want implied in the term “people” the concept of 
affected people, those people affected by the action itself.15 
 
The term “reciprocal” is used to imply the two-way relationship inherent in 
ubuntu, while “value” is a compromise with worth or dignity or any other 
similar term.  People have value because they are people.  That value is 
neither ranked nor prioritised; it is inherent or intrinsic in each person’s 
existence; it is in virtue of their humanity or human-ness.  To that extent, 
one could consider including the term “intrinsic”16 in the definition but I am 
of the view that it would detract from rather than enhance the definition. 
 
In order to try to avoid the connotations and inherent or implied meaning 
of value it may be possible to consider using the German “Wichtigheit”17, 
still meaning value but without its English associations.  However, one could 
then as effectively, and more appropriately, use a Zulu or Xhosa word.  No 
                                                     
15
 I debated whether to include “affected” in the maxim.  I eventually decided that it would provoke 
unnecessary further debate, which I wish to avoid. 
16
 Note that I could possibly have used “extrinsic” as well, in that the argument would be that people have 
a value in virtue of an agreement amongst themselves or the community as a result of accepting 
ubuntu.  That however is a consideration for another time. 
17
 I could equally have used the Kantian term “ Menschenwürde”, but the implications were too great. 
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appropriate translation for “value” or “worth” could be found in either 
language and thus the term “value” was retained. 
 
I also took the decision, following Metz, to include a negative version as this 
allowed some of the concepts to be expanded.  In developing the 
alternative or negative versions of the principle I did not want to merely 
state that the opposite of “right” is “not right” as I considered that obvious.  
What I try to do is express the nuances of what I am trying to achieve with 
the principle.  For example, in using the word “cohesion” I try to imply the 
essence of community, the real binding together that makes a community 
operative.  Rather than use, for example, “uncohesive” I used the term 
“damaging relationships”, as, in my view, it is relationships that create 
cohesion in a community.  The idea of damaging relationships addresses the 
negatives in the interaction between the individual and all other people and 
is the dimension of cohesiveness I wish to emphasise.  The term “devalue” 
is, I believe, a suitable antonym for “value” and well expresses the intention 
that, on the one hand, value must be recognised and, on the other, no 
action must be seen to deny or denigrate this value.  It also seemed 
appropriate in developing this rider that I referred to both the individual 
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and the group as my sense is that both are of equal importance.  It may be 
possible to omit the term “group” here, but it is possible to conceive of 
situations where groups are devalued but individual members of the group 
are not (apartheid still managed to produce several wealthy black people, 
for whatever reason). 
 
There are two further areas to be considered regarding the principle.  The 
first has to do with the implications of the terms “right” and “wrong” as 
opposed to, say “good” and “not good”.  This has to do with whether the 
principle is permissible or obligatory.  In my statement of principle the term 
“insofar as” has been used.  Thus, it states that “An action is right insofar as 
it promotes ..…”.  An alternative would have been to use “if” and thus the 
principle becomes “An action is right if it promotes …..”.  My concern is that 
using “if” is a far stronger form of principle and implies “if and only if”, 
which leaves no room for neutral actions.  However, the main issue has to 
do with “right” and “wrong”.  This goes to the essence of what I am trying 
to achieve.  As opposed to using “right” and “wrong” it is feasible to 
consider other terms such as “An action is admirable insofar as it…..” or “An 
action is morally desirable insofar as it …..”.  Where does that leave the 
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principle?  My sense is that we would be back at the beginning of the 
discussion and would not have a principle so much as a statement of values.  
My intention is to have a statement of obligatory right action – this is what 
you have to do to act in accordance with ubuntu.  For that reason I believe 
that the terms “right” and “wrong” are appropriate in this context. 
 
The second issue to be considered has to do with whether it is possible to 
develop an ubuntu principle of right action at all.  Ramose (2007) states that 
it is not only not possible, but also inappropriate.  In his response to Metz’s 
“Towards an African Moral Theory” (Metz, 2007a) Ramose states:  “*African 
philosophers] speak to a multiplicity of Ethical principles that found and 
permeate African morality without any implicit or explicit claim to 
immutability, essentiality, or eternity.  Metz's quest for a “normative 
theory”, constructed upon a “comprehensive, basic norm”, implies exactly 
the three features disclaimed by African ethics.  Seen from this perspective, 
African ethics is incompatible with absolutism and dogmatism.”  (Ramose, 
2007, P 351).  Ramose contends that there is a chasm between Metz and 
African ethics and that this is created by Metz’s attempt to compare 
Western with African philosophy.  Apart from Ramose’s uncharitable attack 
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on Metz in this paper, it appears to me that Ramose is of the “I’ll know it 
when I see it” ubuntu school seemingly followed by Mokgoro.  True, actions 
speak louder than words, but what I believe Metz and I are trying to do is 
articulate a principle from a cloud of meanings.  Perhaps we are incorrect.  
Perhaps it is “un-African” to do so.  Perhaps it is not possible to do so.  
However, if we cannot develop a principle then King III certainly cannot be 
based on “the moral duties that find expression in the concept of ubuntu” 
as we will not be able to define what exactly those duties are.  Therefore, 
whether it is appropriate to develop a principle or not, it is the only way I 
can proceed to evaluate King III’s claim.18 
 
This, then, is my principle of right action.  I have taken the aphorism “A 
person is a person because of other people” and, based on the work of 
many great scholars, come to an action guiding principle of right action that 
states that: “An action is right insofar as it promotes cohesion and reciprocal 
value amongst people.  An action is wrong insofar as it damages 
relationships and devalues any individual or group.”  I believe that this 
                                                     
18
 And, I must observe, that unlike Hans Kelsen and Thaddeus Metz I was born in Africa and so were my 
family going back some 150 years. 
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captures the essence of ubuntu and provides the principle necessary to 
evaluate the King III Report.19 
 
                                                     
19
 Ideally, at this stage, I suppose I should be testing my principle in a variety of situations to tease out the 
nuances and possible flaws in the principle.  I have not done that, firstly because my principle stands 
on the shoulders of many far more eminent people who have gone before me and it merely tweaks a 
definition based on sound and rigorous philosophical debate and, secondly, because to do so would be 
beyond the scope of this research report. 
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Section 3 
KING III 
Ethical Values and Moral Duties 
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (“King III”) 
follows two earlier reports from the same committee20.  Two documents 
were produced by the King committee.  The first is the King Report on 
Governance for South Africa 2009 and the second the King Code of 
Governance Principles for South Africa 2009.  King III is a lengthy document 
setting out the deliberations and conclusions of the King Committee.  It is 
structured around nine key chapters and within each chapter are sub-
topics, as appropriate, principles and an exposition of practices to support 
the principles.  King III was then essentially condensed into a separate Code 
of Principles, summarising the main points of each chapter in King III. 
 
The intention of King III is to provide an analysis and exposition as to what 
constitutes good corporate governance.  It covers a number of areas, but, 
for purposes of this research report, the essential elements are the areas of 
                                                     
20
 While the composition of the committee has changed over the time the three reports have been 
published, with only three of the original committee constituted in 1992 remaining on the committee, 
the committees have all been under the chairmanship of Judge Mervyn King and have substantially 
followed the same methodologies and processes in producing the reports and deriving the codes. 
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ethical leadership, corporate citizenship and stakeholder relationships.  
Appendix 1 sets out those elements of the Code which are relevant. 
 
Section One of King III discusses the ethical foundation on which the Report 
and Code are based.  It states that: “Ethics (or integrity) is the foundation of, 
and reason for, corporate governance.”  (King III, p21).  King III requires that 
all corporate decisions and actions be based on four “ethical” values: 
responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency.  In addition, five 
“moral duties” are prescribed for company directors: conscience, inclusivity, 
competence, commitment and courage.  (King III, pp21-22).  In discussing 
the four ethical values, King III states that: “leadership is characterised by 
the ethical values of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency 
and based on moral duties that find expression in the concept of ubuntu.”  
(King III, p10)  (my emphasis). 
 
King III also states that the “legitimate interests and expectations of 
stakeholders are [to be] considered when deciding the best interests of the 
company” and that these decisions are to be “made on a case-by-case 
basis” (King III p13).   
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Before proceeding to consider ubuntu and King III, it is important for us to 
consider the philosophical basis underpinning King III.  As will be noted 
below, despite giving some guidance as to interpretation, King III makes use 
of philosophical terminology in a manner that can lead to some confusion.  I 
therefore need to spend some time considering the four ethical values, the 
five moral duties and the theory supporting stakeholder interests in order 
to evaluate what King III seems to consider ethics and morals to mean and 
also, as faithfully as possible, to try to reconstruct what King III means in 
order to evaluate it against ubuntu. 
 
It is important to note that King III does not consider the company to be the 
moral agent but states that it is the leadership that has to comply with the 
five moral duties.  Albeit that the report states that all corporate decisions 
are to be based on the four ethical values the report does say that 
leadership is characterised by those four values.  We therefore do not have 
to concern ourselves with debate about moral agency – whether it is the 
company or its agents who are morally responsible for acts carried out in 
the name of the legal entity, the company.  King III states that it is the 
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directors of the company who have to behave and act in a moral and ethical 
way in their guidance of the company and their decision-making. 
 
King III refers to ethical values and moral duties and these terms need to be 
unpacked and understood if we are to make any progress.  King III itself 
defines these terms as follows:  “’Ethics’ and ‘morality’ (these terms can be 
used interchangeably) refer to that which is good or right in human 
interaction.  Ethics involves three key interlinked concepts – ‘self’, ‘good’ 
and ‘other’.  Thus, one’s conduct is ethical if it gives due consideration not 
only to that which is good for oneself but also good for others.”  (King III, 
p118).  While this explanation is of use, it does not really explain the 
difference between ethical values and moral duties.  If ethics and morality 
are the same, are ethical values and moral duties the same? 
 
It appears that there is general confusion amongst business ethicists as to 
exactly what the difference is between ethics and morality and this 
difference needs to be clarified or at least explained.  Lewis (1985, p381) 
states that "business ethics is rules, standards, codes or principles which 
provide guidelines for morally right behaviour and truthfulness in specific 
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situations.”  While Joyner and Payne (2002, p299) argue “Ethics are defined 
as the conception of what is right and fair conduct or behaviour.  Ethics is a 
system of value principles or practices and the definition of right and wrong.  
Ethics [is] concerned with judgements involved in moral decisions: 
normative judgements which stated or implied something is good or bad, or 
right or wrong.”  And again, later, (p300): "A commonsense, dictionary type 
definition of the word moral or even morality indicates that morality is the 
ability to choose between right and wrong.  Reasonably, the definitions of 
ethics and variety are cross-referenced to each other.  The terms moral and 
ethical have been used interchangeably ……in much of the social issues 
literature." 
 
Boatwright (2007, p22) states that "Generally ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’, 
‘immoral’ and ‘ethical’, and so on are interchangeable.  The presence of the 
two words in the English language with the same meaning is because they 
derive from different routes ‘morality’ from the Latin word moralitas, and 
‘ethics’ from the Greek ethikos ().  There is no difference, therefore, 
between describing [events] as a moral issue and as an ethical issue."  
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To my mind the ethical or moral decision making process is as follows: an 
individual (or a company) has certain values, which we can term "ethical 
values".  These values form the basis for all actions that we take; for all 
decisions that we make; for what we say and what we do.  On the basis of 
our ethical values, we derive “principles” which are guidelines to action.  
For example, we may have honesty as an ethical value.  This would then 
create the principle that we should not steal, from the company or our 
customers or suppliers.  It may also create the principle that we should be 
open and transparent in communicating with our stakeholders.  If we were 
to take this further, especially in the context of King III, we would create a 
Code of Conduct by which to operate the company21. 
 
It seems that, in principle, King III has adopted the same view.  It defines 
values in the following way: "Describing conduct as ‘good’ or ‘right’ means 
measuring it against standards called ‘values’.  Ethical values are convictions 
we hold about what is important in our character and interactions with 
others.  Examples of ethical values are integrity, respect, honesty 
                                                     
21
 In September 2009 the Institute of Directors, in conjunction with the King III committee issued a 
Practice Note entitled “Ethics Management” that deals with the development of a Code of Conduct. 
The integration of ethical standards into the company and the reporting and disclosure of ethical 
conduct.  It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss Codes of Conduct, but readers can access the 
Practice Note on http://www.iodsa.co.za/books.asp?CatID=277. 
49 
 
(truthfulness), responsibility, accountability, fairness, transparency, and 
loyalty.”  (King III, p 119).  It then goes on to say: "Ethical values translate 
into behavioural commitments (principles) or behavioural directors 
(standards, norms and guidelines).  For example, the ethical value honesty 
generates the principle ‘we should be honest’.  This means that we have an 
ethical duty not to deceive but to tell the truth.”  (King III, P119). 
 
Here King III’s intention is understandable.  However, there is no distinction 
between ethical duties and moral duties.  King III does not define “moral” 
other than to say that it can be interchangeable with ethical - then why use 
the term?  From our ethical base, our own values, we may also believe that 
we have certain “moral duties”.  In my opinion these differ from principles, 
in that I aver that moral duties are imperatives or obligations, while 
principles are statements of the duties that provide guidelines as to how we 
give effect to those moral duties, much as is described by King III.  It has 
been argued above that there is little difference between ethics and 
morality, that ethical values and morals mean the same thing.  This may 
well be the case but as King III has differentiated between these two states, 
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we needed to do the same thing.  With this as background, we need to try 
to understand what King III means by ethical values and moral duties. 
 
King III states that the four ethical values are: responsibility, accountability, 
fairness and transparency.  As they stand, we can accept that these are 
values, ethical values that a company and, more importantly, a director 
should exhibit.  We could agree that they are “good” ideals to aspire to; that 
we could use these values to develop action-guiding principles by which to 
run our businesses.  However, we need to understand what King III means 
by these values. 
 
After the preamble, King III starts Chapter 1 (King III, P20) by stating that 
“Good corporate governance is essentially about effective, responsible 
leadership”.  Responsibility has two elements: one is either responsible for 
something or responsible to someone.  This is in accordance with King III, 
which defines responsibility as: “The state or position of having control or 
authority and being accountable for one's actions and decisions."  (King III, 
P122). 
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Being “responsible for” something implies a duty of care or concern.  One is 
responsible for assets under one's control, for example.  It also implies 
being responsible for one's own actions; in other words accepting that one 
is liable for the consequences of one's own behaviour.  Responsibility also 
entails being in charge, whether that be of a company, a division or a 
department. 
 
“Responsible to” has connotations of accountability and in fact it is 
extremely difficult to separate the two meanings.  Accountability is 
discussed below but possibly the differential is that responsibility has to do 
with "ownership" whereas accountability has to do with “stewardship".  
Within the "responsible to" ambit are concepts, ethical values if you like, 
such as trustworthiness and dependability.  After all, one can only be 
trustworthy or dependable to or on behalf of a third party. 
 
The question now is: how does King III see “responsible”?  In Chapter 1 of 
the report, covering ethical leadership and corporate citizenship, Principle 
1.1 lays down what King III regards as responsible leadership.  There are six 
points describing responsible leaders.  The first point creates some 
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confusion when it says that "Responsible leadership is characterised by the 
ethical values of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency.”  
(My emphasis) (King III, P20).  Possibly, we should say that excellent 
leadership or good leadership is characterised by the ethical values of 
responsibility, etc. 
 
The remaining five points list the actions of responsible leaders.  Such 
leaders build sustainable businesses; they reflect on the role of business 
and society; they do business ethically; they do not compromise the natural 
environment; they embrace a shared future with all company stakeholders.  
This list sets out the kinds of actions a responsible leader should undertake.  
I am not sure that it covers every action that a responsible leader should 
take but it certainly seems to attempt to be an all-encompassing list.  My 
concern here is that this is not a description of ethical values but is closer to 
a set of principles or a list of moral duties.22  In other words, rather than 
being a value from which a principle is derived, these values are de facto 
principles.  As an aside, there is also the issue as to what it means to do 
business "ethically"?  King III defines business ethics as: “the ethical values 
                                                     
22
 In fact, in the King III Code (King III Code, 2009, P 20-21) these elements are listed in a column headed 
“Recommended Practice”. 
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that determine the interaction between a company and its stakeholders.”  
(King III, P118).  I am not sure that this is helpful.  What sort of ethics are we 
discussing?  Are these deontological, consequential, utilitarian?  While most 
people would argue that we "understand" what is meant by doing business 
ethically, if that were the case there would be no need for the entire 
discussion of ethics and moral values in King III. 
 
Principle 1.1 then goes on to consider the board’s responsibilities.  In terms 
of point 7, the board is responsible for corporate governance and has "two 
main functions: first, it is responsible for determining the company's 
strategic direction; and second, it is responsible for the control of the 
company.”  (King III, P20)  These seem to me more like duties than 
descriptions of the ethical value of “responsibility”. 
 
Point 8 then causes some concern.  The point states that "The board is 
responsible to ensure that management actively cultivates a culture of 
ethical conduct and sets the values to which the company will adhere.  
These values should be incorporated in a code of conduct.”  (King III, P20).  
Here we are told that the board must ensure that management sets the 
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values to which the company will adhere.  The report has already told us 
what values it expects directors and the company to exhibit.  What values 
will management now set?  Will these be different from the values in the 
report?  It may be more appropriate for this clause to state that the board is 
responsible for ensuring that management and the company adhere to the 
values already laid down in King III. 
 
Items 9 and 10 then cover the board’s responsibility to ensure that the 
company and management behaves or operates in an ethically sound 
manner in line with the values driving the company's business.  This again 
has more to do with action or a duty than a description of the ethical value 
of responsibility. 
 
Finally, for completeness, item 11 covers the company’s relationship with 
stakeholders.  This is discussed in more detail below. 
 
It seems therefore that King III does not actually define “responsibility” as 
an ethical value.  What it does do is give us an indication as to what 
responsible behaviour looks like; in other words it really treats responsibility 
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as a moral duty (or, in its terms, an ethical standard), an action guiding 
principle, as opposed to an ethical value. 
 
Principle 1.1 however continues under point 14 to describe the four ethical 
values.  Point 14.1 states that responsibility means that "the board should 
assume responsibility for the assets and actions of the company and be 
willing to take corrective actions to keep the company on a strategic path 
that is ethical and sustainable.” (King III, P21).  Here we have a "responsible 
for" situation.  Again, this is not a description of an ethical value; it is a 
description of a principal or a duty.  We are therefore unable to decide 
exactly what King III means by the ethical value of “responsibility”. 
 
With regard to accountability, point 14.2 states that accountability means 
that “the board should be able to justify its decisions and actions to 
shareholders and other stakeholders.”  (King III, P21).  Elsewhere, 
accountable is defined as “being responsible and able to justify decisions 
and actions” (King III, P117).  Again, this is not really a definition or 
explanation of an ethical value, although it may be evidence of an ethical 
value in action.  However, as opposed to being some kind of duty, this 
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definition is set out as an ethical principle (in other words it has a broader 
compass) to be used when making decisions or taking action.  It is therefore 
much closer to an ethical value then the concept of responsibility. 
 
Point 14.3, regarding fairness, states that: "the board should ensure that it 
gives fair consideration to the legitimate interests and expectations of all 
stakeholders of the company.”  (King III, P21).  Again, this is not an ethical 
value but a principle to guide stakeholder interaction.  However, later, it 
defines fairness as: “Free from discrimination or dishonesty and in 
conformity with rules and standards”.  (King III, P119).  I am not sure that 
“in conformity with rules and standards” constitutes “fairness”, but 
nevertheless this definition is closer to a value than a principle. 
 
Finally, point 14.4 on transparency states that: "the board should disclose 
information in a manner that enables stakeholders to make an informed 
analysis of the company's performance and sustainability.”  (King III, P21).  
This too is an action guiding principle as opposed to a statement of ethical 
value, while the provided definition states that transparent means: “Easy to 
understand or recognise; obvious; candid; open; frank.”  (King III, P128), a 
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combined series of descriptors and values which leaves me more confused 
than informed. 
 
It may seem that the above has been pedantic in trying to differentiate 
between ethical values, principles and duties.  However, it seems to me that 
if one is going to use terminology one should use it correctly and 
consistently.  This is especially true if we cannot take the terminology at 
face value due to its confused usage and will have to reconstruct it to create 
some means of evaluating whether King III is based on the philosophy of 
ubuntu.  If we took the last item for example, that of transparency, then, as 
an ethical value, it could be defined as "Transparency is openness and 
honesty.  In a business context the ethical importance of transparency is 
that it is the responsible provision of information to all stakeholders to 
allow for an informed analysis of company’s historic performance, current 
financial position and future sustainability."  (My definition).  Below I try to 
address this issue by creating a heuristic for good corporate governance 
based on the ethical principles and moral values I believe are espoused by 
King III. 
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If we accept that the "ethical values" as laid down in King III could be ethical 
values but have essentially been defined or described as action guiding 
principles, then we need to consider the five moral duties.  Again, the 
purpose of this analysis is to come to a position where King III has not only 
been analysed but where we can interpret and reconstruct what is meant 
by the authors of King III, as opposed to what is written. 
 
In Principle 1.1, point 15, King III (pp 21-22) lays out what it terms the five 
moral duties, being conscience, inclusivity, competence, commitment and 
courage.  To my mind the problem now compounds itself, as a number of 
these duties are in fact similar to ethical values.  If we start with conscience, 
King III says, in defining conscience, that "A director should act with 
intellectual honesty and independence of mind in the best interests of the 
company and all its stakeholders in accordance with the inclusive 
stakeholder approach to corporate governance.”  (King III, 2009, P21)  Now 
intellectual honesty and independence of mind are ethical values.  It may 
be that couching them with the directive that a director should act with 
these values therefore makes "conscience" a moral duty, but I think not; the 
definition of conscience is essentially too broad to be seen as a duty.   
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The second moral duty of inclusivity is essentially an obligation (and 
therefore a moral duty), in that point 15.2 states that "legitimate interests 
and expectations of stakeholders must be taken into account in decision-
making and strategy".  (King III, 2009, P22)  This requires no further 
elaboration.  However, the issue of stakeholders is discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
With regard to point 15.3, competence by itself can surely not be a virtue 
nor a moral duty; it is an attribute of a director.  The moral duty arises from 
the necessity continually to develop the competence.  Perhaps where the 
ethical virtue or moral duty comes about is that a director should not put 
him/herself forward to be a director and unless he/she is competent. 
 
The fourth moral duty of commitment requires a director, in terms of 15.4, 
to be diligent to devote sufficient time and to be unwavering in dedication 
and effort.  This unquestionably is a moral duty. 
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The fifth moral duty is courage.  Now courage itself is surely an ethical 
value.  However point 15.5 does not talk about courage per se but the 
courage required to take risk and to act with integrity.  So the moral duty 
here is to act with courage, where courage is the ethical value. 
 
Where does this leave us as far as King III’s ethical values and moral duties 
are concerned?  Certainly confused.  It therefore seems to me that the 
concepts of ethical values and moral duties need to be revisited in total in 
order to create a coherent set of principles, ethical moral or otherwise, by 
which to make decisions as a manager or a board member.  In this regard, 
see below.  
 
King III and Stakeholder Theory 
 
Throughout King III there is reference to stakeholders.  These are the people 
to whom the company belongs and for whom the company exists and 
includes the wider community.  There is a large body of literature on 
stakeholder theory itself and my intention is to establish whether the 
principles, ethical values or moral duties, as laid down in King III, and as 
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interpreted below, can be incorporated into stakeholder theory and, 
thereafter, to consider if stakeholder theory and ubuntu are compatible.  At 
the heart of this analysis is to avoid a possible problem, which could arise if 
King III is compatible with stakeholder theory, but stakeholder theory is not 
compatible with ubuntu.  In this case it would be difficult to state that is the 
ethical values and moral duties laid down in King III do find expression in 
the concept of ubuntu 
 
Hasnas states that currently there are essentially three leading normative 
theories of business ethics - the stockholder, stakeholder, and social 
contract theories (Hasnas 1998).  King III essentially espouses stakeholder 
theory and therefore, while the other theories may have value, they will not 
be further discussed in this report. 
 
Stakeholder theory, as espoused by Freeman and others,23 essentially 
observes that businesses are not independent of their various stakeholders 
and that, as the stakeholders have various rights, so business has a moral 
                                                     
23
 See for example: (Freeman 1994, Freeman 1999, Freeman, McVea, Mitchell, Agle & Wood 1997) 
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duty to acknowledge those rights and to coordinate and promote 
stakeholder interests.   
 
My concern is that I am not sure one can argue that stakeholder theory is 
actually a (single) normative theory.  As I shall discuss below, it seems to me 
that either there are various normative stakeholder theories or there are 
various normative business ethical theories that use stakeholder theory to 
define the actors in applying the theory. 
 
Stakeholder theory was brought to the fore by Freeman who defines 
stakeholders as follows: “A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) 
any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organization's objectives.”  (Freeman, 1984, p46).   
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Figure 1.  A Typical Stakeholder Map 
(Freeman 1984, p25) 
 
 
It can be seen from Figure 1 that Freeman’s definition is extremely broad 
and encompasses any group that has anything to do with the company.  If 
one goes through the extensive literature on this topic, it is evident that 
there is an enormous range of stakeholders.  There are primary or 
secondary stakeholders, customers and suppliers, rights holders, moral 
claimants, resource providers in terms of land, labour and capital, 
stakeholders to whom a fiduciary duty is owed and those to whom merely 
an ethical consideration is due, government and even future, as yet unborn, 
generations. 
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There is some debate as to whether all this analysis is appropriate.  
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997, p854) suggest that classes of stakeholder 
can be categorised based on “their possession or attributed possession of 
one, two, or all three of the following attributes: (1) the stakeholder's 
power to influence the firm, (2) the legitimacy of the stakeholder's 
relationship with the firm, and (3) the urgency of the stakeholder's claim on 
the firm.”  
 
A large part of the stakeholder literature is devoted to discussing and 
identifying stakeholders, largely, one suspects, with a view to identifying the 
rights applicable to the various stakeholder groupings.  Thereafter the moral 
or ethical basis for considering stakeholders at all has become the basis of 
considerable debate.  When proposed in his book Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach, Freeman’s initial view of stakeholder theory was that 
“Each of these stakeholder groups has a right not to be treated as a means 
to some end, and therefore must participate in determining the future 
direction of the firm in which they have a stake.”  (Freeman 1984, p46, as 
quoted in Gibson (2000) p248).  This obviously Kantian approach was 
further developed by Freeman and Evan (1990) and seeps into much 
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subsequent literature.  Clarkson (2000), for example, describes three 
approaches to stakeholder theory, being based on prudence, agency theory 
and deontological views.  In his view, deontology provides the strongest 
basis for a normative stakeholder theory.  Others have used principles of 
fairness (Phillips, 1997) or care (Wicks, Freeman and Gilbert, 1994), or social 
contract theory (Donaldson and Dunfree, 1999).  Ramakrishna and 
Venkataraman (2007) approach stakeholder theory as a group of contracts 
amongst the firm's stakeholders, while Wicks, in several publications, looks 
at stakeholders from a feminist point of view.  As Jones and Wicks (1999, p 
211) note: “A concern for distributive justice and fairness is also widely held 
among stakeholder theory adherents, although the propriety of various 
distributive principles will always be hotly debated.” 
 
Another approach is that of trying to marry both stakeholder and 
shareholder theories.  Cragg (2002) states that companies owe their 
existence to a partnership between shareholders and the community that is 
based on an understanding that companies have an unconditional (or what 
he call a categorical) obligation to treat stakeholders ethically while creating 
shareholder wealth.  Even Freeman (Freeman and Phillips, 2002) seems to 
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be moving towards a combination of both aspects, but then, reading much 
of Freeman, he seems eager to find any acceptable base from which to 
strengthen his stakeholder theories. 
 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) describe stakeholder theory as managerial, 
in that it requires the active involvement of managers to manage the 
stakeholder relationship process; as descriptive, in that it presents a model 
describing the corporation; as instrumental, in that it provides a model for 
examining the relationship between stakeholder management and 
performance; and as normative, as it involves acceptance that stakeholders 
have legitimate interests in the corporation and their interests are all of 
intrinsic value.  Henry (2001, p159) notes that:“Normative stakeholder 
theory is rooted in the apparently straightforward moral intuition that a 
firm's responsibilities to its various stakeholders should go significantly 
beyond what is accepted by contemporary shareholder/stockholder 
approaches, and it has found considerable support among business 
ethicists.” 
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However, it seems that the debate on stakeholder theory will continue for a 
while.  Jones and Wicks (1999, p212) note that “stakeholder theory 
advocates, particularly the ethicists among them, are sharply divided on the 
appropriate moral foundation for stakeholder theory.”  Donaldson and 
Preston (1995, pp92-93) themselves note that “More formal justifications of 
stakeholder theory might be based either on broad theories of 
philosophical ethics such as utilitarianism, or on narrower “middle-level” 
theories derived from the notion that a “social contract” exists between 
corporations or society.”  While Hendry (2001, p159) observes that “After a 
decade of intensive debate, stakeholder ideas have come to exert a 
significant influence on academic management thinking, but normative 
stakeholder theory itself appears to be in a state of disarray and confusion.” 
 
I think the entire debate is best summed up by the father of stakeholder 
theory, R Edward Freeman, when he notes (Agle et al, Page 7) that “The 
more I read about what has come to be called stakeholder theory, perhaps 
the more embarrassed I get for having had some minor role in its 
beginning.”  At the end of all of this, we are left with a view that stakeholder 
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theory is still in the process of development and that much debate will 
continue. 
 
It appears to me that King III is not so much concerned with the ethics 
behind stakeholder theory but seeks inclusivity of all stakeholders in the 
company.  Chapter 8, point 6 (King III, p 100) states that: 
A stakeholder-inclusive corporate governance approach recognises 
that a company has many stakeholders that can affect the company in 
the achievement of its strategy and long-term sustained growth.  
Stakeholders can be considered to be any group that can affect the 
company's operations, or be affected by the company's operations.  
Stakeholders include shareholders, institutional investors, creditors, 
lenders, suppliers, customers, regulators, employees, unions, the 
media, analysts, consumers, society in general, communities, auditors 
and potential investors.  This list is not exhaustive. 
At point 7, King III states that the board should “identify important 
stakeholder groupings, as well as their legitimate interests and 
expectations, relative to the company's strategic objectives and long-term 
sustainability."  (King III, p 100).  It seems that King III therefore is more 
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concerned with the identification and needs of stakeholders than any 
ethical basis underpinning stakeholder theory.  We do, however, need to 
consider ubuntu and stakeholders.  It seems to me that ubuntu, with its 
concern for individuals and community has everything to do with 
stakeholders and vice versa.  However, there is a potential conflict because 
ubuntu seems to imply that everyone is of equal value and should be 
treated as such, while stakeholder theory acknowledges that the various 
stakeholders have to be treated differently.  For example, shareholders, 
employees and customers have more claims against the company than the 
external community, and this is right.  Does this then imply that the two 
concepts are incompatible?  I think not.  I believe that ubuntu will accept 
differentiation between people, provided that the principles themselves are 
not contravened.  This means, provided differentiation between groups or 
classes of stakeholder maintains cohesion and the promotion of reciprocal 
value and does not cause damage to relationships or devalue people 
(humanity), that there is no conflict between ubuntu and stakeholder 
theory.  While this acceptance of differentiation between people is 
evidenced by experience and in conversation with numerous South Africans 
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claiming to live by ubuntu, I have found little literature24 to support this.  
That does not invalidate the relationship between ubuntu and stakeholder 
theory, it is merely a caveat, which must be borne in mind. 
 
King III states that the legitimate interests of stakeholders as well as the 
best interests of the company are to be considered when making decisions.  
This is, essentially, an ethical principle and, as such has to be held up to the 
ubuntu principle.  Stakeholders are all people or groups affected by their 
interaction with the company with various concentric circles of influence 
around and within the company.  Their influence, and therefore their 
impact on or by the company, is based on a contingency approach that 
avers that their level of influence depends on the situation at the time.  
Ubuntu requires that all people are treated fairly, that interactions between 
them and, by implication, between them and the company are to promote 
social cohesion and reciprocal value between the parties.  It should be 
noted that the report refers to “legitimate” interests of stakeholders.  It is 
hard to see how illegitimate interests could be up for consideration, unless 
                                                     
24
 Louw (2002, p4) notes that “Although there may be a hierarchy of importance among the speakers, 
every person gets an equal chance to speak up until some kind of an agreement, consensus or group 
cohesion is reached”.  He observes in a footnote, however, that “According to some authors no such 
hierarchy is assumed”. 
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this is a device to allow companies to arbitrarily dismiss claims by 
stakeholders.  That hardly seems likely in terms of the spirit of the report.  
At this level, it therefore seems that the stakeholder-focused approach 
adopted by King III is very much reflective of ubuntu.   
 
A further observation to be made is that the survival of the company is 
paramount as, if it fails, all stakeholders are harmed.  Therefore, in 
prioritising actions, the (long-term) interests of the company should always 
be considered, especially as the sustainability of the company is to the 
benefit of all stakeholders.  This focus on stakeholders is aligned with the 
concern for individual and community or group in ubuntu.  King III's 
emphasis on stakeholders is therefore in line with and finds expression in 
the concept of ubuntu. 
 
 
A King III Heuristic for Decision Making 
At this stage, I have considered the concept of ubuntu and have developed 
an action-guiding principle by which we can assess the various 
recommendations in King III.  I have considered the issues raised by King III’s 
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use of the stakeholder concept and accepted that, while there might be 
slight differences, there is no basic conflict between ubuntu and stakeholder 
theory.  I have considered the problems arising from an imprecise use of 
terminology in King III and it is this aspect I wish to develop further in this 
section. 
 
If we set aside concerns about the meaning of ethical values and moral 
duties and accept that King III has given us a list of characteristics that it 
wishes to see exhibited by management and the board in the context of a 
stakeholder environment, then we can proceed to produce a heuristic for 
corporate action in decision-making in compliance with King III.   
 
Copeland (2008) describes a heuristic as being: “any rule-of-thumb principle 
that cuts down the amount of searching required in order to find a solution 
to a problem”.  Heuristics have been used from the time of Euclid25.  Kant is 
reputed to have used a heuristic developed by an earlier associate in 
developing his ideas for Living Forces (Schönfeld, 2008).  Nowadays 
heuristics are largely used in mathematics and computer science, but there 
                                                     
25
 In fact the word “heuristic” is derived from the Greek Eureka – “I have found it”. 
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is no reason why the principle should not be used in any appropriate 
situation.  For our purpose, which is to evaluate King III and ubuntu, I 
decided that creating a heuristic would provide a set of decision rules 
emanating from King III, which would allow all the recommended actions of 
the board and management to be evaluated against what King III calls the 
ethical values and moral duties, now encapsulated in the heuristic.  Groner, 
Groner and Bischoff (1983) have the following to say about heuristics: 
Nowadays the main usage of the word "heuristic" is mostly the 
adjective in the sense of "guiding discovery" or "improving problem 
solving."  There might also be a slightly negative meaning attached to 
it of a less than perfect method or a lack of solution guarantee.  The 
modern picture of a search for the solution, which might be 
intelligently directed but still has its inherent uncertainty, leads to its 
origin in ancient Greece where the verb "heuriskein" means to find.  
In the history of science we find attempts to formulate methods for 
finding proofs and for arriving at new discoveries.  They belong to 
what was sometimes called the art of discovery, or later, heuristics.  
(Groner, et al. 1983, p1) 
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I accept that by developing this heuristic I am not producing the definitive 
explanation of King III’s intentions.  In fact, I consider the element of 
uncertainty essential as it allows freedom of interpretation in an area that is 
certainly fluid and open to different readings.  Suppes (1983) confirms this 
view when he states that “If a heuristic achieves a total degree of 
explicitness it passes from being a heuristic to being an algorithm.”  (Suppes 
1983, p87).  What I am attempting to do is set out the process or procedure 
by which actions recommended in King III should be measured.  For my 
purposes, if the heuristic covers the values and duties laid down in King III, 
then I can evaluate the heuristic rather than each and every 
recommendation throughout the report.  This will allow the evaluation of 
King III's contention that its view of leadership is based on the ethical values 
and moral duties that find expression in the concept of ubuntu without the 
impossible task of deconstructing King III line by line. 
 
In the Introduction and Background to the King III Report, Point 8 (p 10) 
states that “The philosophy of the Report revolves around leadership, 
sustainability and corporate citizenship." and shortly thereafter observes 
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that "Good governance is essentially about effective leadership…..based on 
moral duties that find expression in the concept of Ubuntu."   
 
The characteristics of good governance and effective leadership, as 
enunciated by King III are: responsibility, accountability, fairness, 
transparency, conscience, inclusivity, competence, commitment and 
courage.  Every action taken by management and the board, the main focus 
of King III, as well as by all employees should exhibit those characteristics.  
If we use those to create a decision rule, we would have the heuristic as set 
out below: 
 
Management and the board are: 
responsible for maintaining the assets of the company and achieving 
sustainable economic, social and environmental performance; 
responsible to the various stakeholders for their performance; 
accountable to the stakeholders for their stewardship of the company; 
to be committed to fairness in their dealings with all stakeholders, taking 
into account the various claims stakeholders have in and against the 
company; 
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to be transparent, open and honest in all their dealings with the various 
stakeholders and in their reporting of their sustainable performance; 
to act in good conscience “with intellectual honesty and independence of 
mind in the best interests of the company and all its stakeholders” (King III, 
P21); 
to include all stakeholders and their legitimate interests and expectations in 
decision-making and strategy formulation; 
to exhibit, maintain and develop competency in their various positions; 
to be committed, diligent and dedicated in the performance of their duties; 
to have the courage to take the measured risks necessary for the company 
to succeed; 
to have the courage to act with integrity and conscience at all times. 
 
In my view the heuristic above sets out the ethical principles underpinning 
how the board and management are to act in governing the firm.  The next 
task is to examine each element of the heuristic to determine if each does 
find expression in my ubuntu-based action-guiding principle.  This is done in 
the next section. 
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Section 4 
UBUNTU AND KING III 
King III states that good governance is “characterised by the ethical values 
of responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency and based on 
moral duties that find expression in the concept of Ubuntu."  (King III, p 10).  
Further, in stating that the board is to ensure that the company acts like and 
is seen to be a responsible corporate citizen, King III sets out a number of 
attributes and actions of corporate citizenship and then states: “In the 
African context these moral duties find expression in the concept of 
ubuntu…”  (King III, p23).  I am not sure to which moral duties this refers.  
Nevertheless, what is under discussion here is what is meant by “find 
expression in”?  Understandably, this is not defined in King III, but I think it 
needs briefly to be explored.  My sense, which I think would align with King 
III, is that find expression in means representing or reflecting the object.  
Therefore, finding expression in the concept of ubuntu means representing 
or giving effect to the concept of ubuntu.  It is important to clarify this as we 
examine each element in the King III heuristic to establish if it does 
represent the concept of ubuntu. 
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My ubuntu principle, as discussed above, states that: “An action is right 
insofar as it promotes cohesion and reciprocal value amongst people.  An 
action is wrong insofar as it damages relationships and devalues any 
individual or group.”  This definition can be broken down into four 
constituent parts: an action is right if it promotes cohesion amongst people; 
an action is right if it promotes reciprocal value amongst people; an action 
is right if it does not damage relationships; an action is right if it does not 
devalue any individual or group. 
 
The issue then is to determine whether each characteristic of this King III 
heuristic, to a greater or lesser extent, complies with the four elements of 
the ubuntu definition:  cohesion, reciprocal value, no damage to 
relationships and no devaluation of people.  If they do so, I believe we can 
accept that the ethical and moral duties and values as laid down in King III 
actually do reflect the ethical values of ubuntu. 
 
Two aspects require discussion before proceeding.  In the first instance, I do 
not believe that there can be one-to-one correspondence between King III 
and ubuntu.  Nor do I think it would be appropriate if it were the case.  King 
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III may have developed its ethical principles and moral values to reflect the 
principle of ubuntu, but there will be many other ethical frameworks which 
are mirrored by King III.  Furthermore, I do not expect each element of the 
King III heuristic to reflect all four of the components of the ubuntu 
principle, although it may.  My approach is to determine whether each 
element of the King III heuristic reflects at least one of four components 
and does not conflict with any of the others.  If that is the situation then I 
believe I can claim that King III does find expression in the concept of 
ubuntu. 
 
 
Responsibility 
As noted above, there are two areas of responsibility - responsible for 
maintaining the assets of the company and "achieving sustainable 
economic, social and environmental performance" (King III, P10) and 
responsible to the various stakeholders for their performance.   
 
I suppose it could be argued that maintaining the assets of the company is 
an overriding imperative and that assets could be maintained to the 
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detriment of a large number of stakeholders.  One only has to consider the 
effects of "asset maintenance" on the community by the asbestos related 
claims against Cape Plc and Gencor, finalised in 2003, to understand the 
conflict26.  King III however adds that this asset maintenance has to be 
achieved while at the same time maintaining sustainable economic, social 
and environmental performance.  This rider therefore essentially forestalls 
asset maintenance at the cost of sustainability but does oblige us briefly to 
consider what is meant by sustainability. 
 
Sustainable development is defined in many different ways, but it appears 
that the most frequently quoted definition is from Our Common Future, 
also known as the Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987, p. 43): 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.  It contains within it two key concepts: 
                                                     
26
 In this widely reported case, Cape Plc and Gencor Limited, had for years run asbestos mines in Limpopo 
and Northern Cape where the focus was on maintaining the business and where the communities were 
decimated by damaging environmental concentrations of asbestos.  After lengthy legal battles in the 
English High Court, Cape reached a settlement agreement with the claimants in 2001, but was unable to 
meet its terms. Renewed litigation in 2002 resulted in the signing of three new settlement agreements in 
2003 (Meeran, 2003) 
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1. the concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the 
world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and 
2. the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and 
social organization on the environment's ability to meet present 
and future needs. 
 
The International Institute for Sustainable Development (2011) defines 
Economically Sustainable as: 
the characteristic of prolonged, careful, efficient and prudent (wise 
and judicious) use of resources (natural, fiscal, human), products, 
facilities, and services.  It is based on thorough knowledge and 
involves operating with little waste and accounting for all costs and 
benefits, including those which are not marketable and can result in 
savings. 
 
These two internationally accepted definitions match the definition of 
sustainable in King III (King III, p 128), which states that: “Sustainability of a 
company means conducting operations in a manner that meet existing 
needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
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needs.  It means having regard to the impact that the business operations 
have on the economic life of the community in which operates.  
Sustainability includes environmental, social and governance issues." 
 
It is apparent that “sustainability at all costs” is not what is intended in King 
III and, accordingly, we can accept that King III suggests that this 
responsibility for maintaining the assets of the company ought to be carried 
out in the best interest of present and future stakeholders. 
 
Does this mean that “responsible for” finds expression in the concept of 
ubuntu?  The element of promoting reciprocal value is evident, especially in 
the area of sustainability, bearing in mind that sustainability has to do with 
sustaining the community and environment as well as sustaining the 
business.  Similarly, acting to maintain the assets sustainably will create or 
support jobs, and should not damage relationships nor devalue people.  In 
fact, sustainable business practices should enhance relationships with 
stakeholders and certainly demonstrate the value of people.  In my opinion, 
this aspect of King III’s recommendations does reflect the values of ubuntu.  
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Apart from for what and to whom the board and management are 
responsible, we also need to consider another view of responsible.  Being 
responsible implies accepting ownership, liability or accountability.  It is 
unlikely that people would not accept responsibility for right acts, so we 
have to consider responsibility for wrong acts.  Our principle states that it is 
wrong to damage relationships or devalue any individual or group.  Would it 
be wrong to deny or refuse to accept responsibility for any wrong act 
committed?  Refusing to accept responsibility would certainly have the 
result of damaging a relationship, as it would be akin to lying.  It would also 
devalue the affected individual or group, in that they would feel inferior or 
belittled by someone not regarding them as important enough to accept 
responsibility for harmful acts.  We are also enjoined to promote cohesion 
and reciprocal value and thus taking responsibility for someone (some 
group) could be regarded as demonstrating the value of the people 
concerned.  If we briefly revert to the Cape Plc case above, the company 
tried to avoid taking responsibility for its actions in carelessly mining 
asbestos.  It was claimed that South African legislation adequately provides 
for workers injured on the job and that it was government’s responsibility to 
compensate the people affected.  Such a case certainly demonstrates a lack 
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of accountability and certainly devalued the people in the mining areas.  
King III considers that being responsible includes being accountable for ones 
actions and decisions (King III, P 122) and this is thus in accordance with my 
ubuntu principle. 
 
Finally, we must consider who is responsible to whom in this relationship.  
The ubuntu principle places positive and negative duties on all people.  In 
my view this concept of responsibility, while perhaps intended in King III as 
a one-way relationship between the company and its stakeholders, also 
could demand responsibility between stakeholders.  To expand this further, 
a company is responsible for paying its workforce and creating acceptable 
conditions of employment while the workforce is responsible for being 
productive and putting in a fair day's work; similarly a company must 
provide satisfactory products or services while the customers must pay time 
initially for what they receive; and so we could continue considering each 
stakeholder group.  How does this fit into ubuntu?  By working together, 
each group, each person, being responsible to the other, we build cohesion 
amongst the group and acknowledge that we have reciprocal value, one 
with another.  This too is in line with the values of ubuntu. 
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All three aspects of responsibility have been shown to contain elements of 
ubuntu, and I believe that we can thus accept that "responsibility", in terms 
of King III, does indeed reflect the values of ubuntu. 
 
 
Accountability 
Neither King III nor I can easily differentiate between accountability and 
responsibility.27  I thus reverted to a dictionary definition of each term.  The 
Oxford English Dictionary (1971) defines accountability as: “The quality of 
being accountable; liability to give account of, and answer for, discharge of 
duties or conduct; responsibility” while responsibility is defined as: “The 
state or fact of being responsible; a charge, trust or duty for which one is 
responsible.”  Responsible itself is defined as: “answerable, accountable”.  
This is hardly helpful. 
 
                                                     
27
 As noted above, King III defines accountable as “Being responsible and able to justify and explain 
decisions and actions” (King III, P117). 
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I would argue that “accountable”, in King III28, has to do with stewardship.  
The directors are stewards of the business and are accountable to 
shareholders; the company is the steward of its environment and is 
therefore accountable to the community; the company is the steward of its 
employees’ futures and as such is accountable to them and their families.  
Accountability is also to do with people giving an account of themselves.  
On these interpretations, therefore, accountability could be regarded as 
different from responsibility.  Accountability of course goes back to feudal 
times when land users gave an account of their stewardship to landowners, 
which accounts were heard by the "auditors".  
 
An aspect of accountability, which shall also be considered under the 
heading “Transparency”, is that the account has to be understandable.  One 
of the complaints one regularly hears is that financial statements prepared 
by companies do more to confuse than enlighten and in fact the worse the 
company's performance the more unreadable the financial statements 
(Baker, Kare & Dilip, 1992; Courtis, 1995; 1998; Jones, 1994; 1996;  Smith 
                                                     
28 It seems appropriate to accept that, despite their definition, the authors of King III must have believed 
that there was a difference between responsibility and accountability, or why else include both terms?  
Our task, therefore is to determine what they intended by each term. 
87 
 
and Taffler, 1992; Subramanian, Insley & Blackwell, 1993).  It is therefore 
incumbent on companies to report, to give an account of themselves, in 
such a way that they do not, in virtue of the manner in which they report, 
that is in terms of the language that is used and the manner of reporting, 
produce financial reports that are essentially unintelligible to the average 
user.  Such reports imply little concern for the users of financial statements, 
the stakeholders, and, in so doing, devalue them, thus also damaging the 
relationships.  King III is at pains to recommend that reporting should be 
intelligible.  It states that reporting should be “focused on substance over 
form and should disclose information that is complete, timely, relevant, 
accurate, honest and accessible and comparable past performance of the 
company" (King III, P109).  Furthermore, the company should produce a 
commentary on the results which should "include information to enable a 
stakeholder to make an informed assessment of the company's economic 
value" (King III, P109).  It thus appears that the intention in King III is to be 
accountable to stakeholders, thus demonstrating that stakeholders are not 
to be devalued and relationships not to be damaged, thereby reflecting the 
principle of ubuntu. 
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Fairness 
Fairness as an ethical value is a straightforward value to understand.  
Fairness has to do with even-handedness, with treating people with the 
same criteria, from the same ethical base.  Treating people fairly 
demonstrates that all people are of equal value.  My action-guiding 
principle of ubuntu requires us to promote reciprocal value amongst people 
and not to devalue any individual or group.  It is only by treating others 
fairly that we can promote reciprocal value.  A lack of fairness certainly 
damages relationships and so this value too complies with the principles of 
ubuntu. 
 
I want to observe here that fairness does not equate to equality, but to 
equity.  This value does not espouse treating all people equally, but treating 
them fairly, even-handedly – recognising that they are all of equal value.  
This is an important distinction that has partially been discussed above 
when considering von Papendorf’s views.  Based on my discussions with a 
range of supporters of ubuntu, as well as on general observation, equality 
as opposed to fairness is not an element of ubuntu.  Ubuntu requires us to 
value others within the community but does not mean that a communalistic 
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or communistic approach has to be adopted.  Certainly, those that have 
more than others would be expected to share, to care, but not to give 
everything away.  Ubuntu does recognise differences between people.  At 
an anthropological level, the environment in which ubuntu developed 
certainly recognised differences between chiefs, elders and the rest of the 
people (and certainly between men and women).  The same recognition 
would be appropriate today in considering the hierarchy of the firm, or a 
hierarchy amongst stakeholders.  To take this further, equal treatment 
would imply that everyone in the firm earned the same salary, fair 
treatment would imply that everyone earned what he or she was worth in 
relation to their contribution to the firm, and ubuntu would support this. 
 
King III specifically deals with this issue in its principle 8.3 (King III, p102) 
which requires the board to strive to achieve an appropriate balance 
between the various stakeholder groupings.  My sense is that here King III 
becomes confused about the distinction between “fairness” and “equality” 
when it states that: 
This does not mean that the company should and could always treat 
all stakeholders fairly.  Some may be more significant to the company 
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in particular circumstances and it is not always possible to promote 
the interests of all stakeholders in all corporate decisions.  It is 
important however that stakeholders have confidence that the board 
will consider their legitimate interests and expectations in an 
appropriate manner and guided by what is in the best interests of the 
company. 
 
In principle, however, I believe that King III and I are in agreement, as 
ensuring that stakeholders have confidence that they will be considered, as 
stated above, implies “fair” if not “equal” treatment.  On this basis, 
therefore, the King III concept of fairness does find expression in ubuntu. 
 
 
Transparency 
The ethical value of transparency is similar to accountability, but with a 
different emphasis.  Transparency implies openness, honesty, a lack of guile.  
As such, it is an essential element of ubuntu.  King III defines transparent as: 
“Easy to understand or recognise; obvious; candid; open; frank.”  (P128)  
Part of this definition has to do with financial reporting and is dealt with 
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elsewhere.  The “candid, open, frank” element of the definition agrees with 
my interpretation here.  What does transparency have to do with ubuntu?  
Perhaps here we should consider the relationship between transparency 
and ubuntu from a negative perspective.  A lack of transparency between 
people creates a climate of distrust and suspicion and, as such, certainly 
damages relationships.  Envisage a situation where, say, five people are 
eligible for a promotion.  To each other they all seem equal in terms of 
ability, qualification and experience.  It is suddenly announced that one of 
the five is to be promoted, but there has been no advertisement of the 
position, there have been no interviews, just the sudden promotion.  The 
first question to be asked is who is sleeping with who followed closely by 
who is related to whom?  No matter how good the reasons behind the 
promotion, because there was no transparency, the four overlooked staff 
members will resent the appointment, will probably do everything in their 
power to undermine the new appointee, or may just resign to work 
elsewhere.  And we can all think of similar examples.  This lack of 
transparency would certainly damage relationships and would probably also 
tend to make some of the group feel devalued.  The action would also not 
have promoted cohesion amongst the staff.  Thus transparency is necessary 
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for ubuntu to exist.  My sense is that, inherently, ubuntu presupposes 
transparency amongst people.  So transparency also would reflect the 
principle of ubuntu. 
 
A question to be asked is whether transparency could damage relationships.  
It is possible to conceive a situation where too much information could 
possibly damage relationships and cohesiveness.  In my class, for example, 
students do not want marks published by name.  In fact, they do not even 
want returned tests to be made available to the class - they must be placed 
in each individual pigeonhole.  This is because students who have fared 
badly do not want to be embarrassed in front of their classmates and to 
make marks public would or could damage group cohesiveness.  What my 
students do want, in terms of transparency, is to be informed of the process 
behind the marking and to be given the mark plan - all with the objective of 
ensuring that they are fairly treated.  Such transparency does build 
cohesiveness.  I suppose, therefore, that one ought to qualify the concept 
and say that “responsible transparency” reflects the ethical value of ubuntu. 
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Conscience 
King III calls upon the board and management to act in good conscience 
with intellectual honesty and independence of mind in the best interests of 
the company and all its stakeholders.  King III gives some indication as to 
the type of behaviour expected of directors (and, by implication, 
management).  Each decision made by the board is to be founded on 
intellectual honesty, considering all the relevant facts; directors should 
exercise objective judgement; personal interests should not take 
precedence over the affairs of the company; conflicts of interest should be 
avoided.  (King III, P32).  King III does not attempt to define conscience per 
se, but, in its discussion on values, it states that: “Ethical values are 
convictions we hold about what is important in our character…” (King III, 
P119).  In my view, conscience, in this context, has to do with behaving in a 
manner that is aligned to one’s core values (or ethical values).  When one 
behaves contrary to one’s values, conscience comes to the fore.  How then 
does acting in good conscience find expression in the concept of ubuntu?  In 
the first instance, acting against one’s conscience could be seen as 
devaluing oneself in that a dissonance between one’s true self (the self of 
the core values) and apparent self (the self acting against those core values) 
94 
 
has been created.  Only if psychopathic would this not be demeaning 
(devaluing) of self. 
 
I believe it could be argued that, in order to promote cohesion and 
reciprocal value, individuals, groups and companies should all behave in a 
manner aligned with personal, group or corporate values.  These core 
values could differ from one person, group or company to the next, but it is 
hardly feasible that any group of people or company could possibly exist 
and flourish with totally discordant values.  To promote cohesion and 
reciprocal value amongst people, we need to have shared values.  
Therefore, if we are to have values that would find expression in ubuntu, as 
proposed in King III, we are to have a common conscience between us. 
 
If we move beyond the word conscience to King III’s additional terms - 
intellectual honesty and independence of mind – is there more to add?  
How do these find expression in ubuntu?  The problem is that we are here 
dealing with process or character.  King III states that “the foundation for 
each decision [by the board] should be intellectual honesty, based on the 
relevant facts.  Objectively speaking the decision should be a rational one 
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considering all the relevant facts at the time.”  (King III, p32)  That, surely, is 
how all rational people should make decisions?  It has no real ubuntu 
context.  It could be argued that the types of acts that would typify or be 
required by ubuntu demand these characteristics, but then so many other 
characteristics are also required, as is a good conscience in any moral actor.  
I can see no real ubuntu relationship here. 
 
The last aspect that needs to be discussed here is that of “the best interests 
of the company”.  King III observes in Principle 2.14 that “The board must 
always act in the best interests of the company.  In terms of our common 
law, as developed through jurisprudence, the best interests of the company 
has been interpreted to equate to the best interests of the body of 
shareholders.”  (King III, p31).  If the principle stopped there, there could 
well be a conflict with ubuntu.  However, the principle continues:  “The 
[Companies] Act29 states that its purpose is to promote compliance with the 
Bill of Rights as provided for in the Constitution.  This purpose, as stated, 
constitutes a departure from the traditional narrow interpretation of the 
best interests of the company.”  (King III, pp31-32).  There is a reasonably 
                                                     
29
 Act no. 71 of 2008, the new Companies Act. 
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strong body of Constitutional judgements indicating that ubuntu is a strong 
basis underpinning the constitution30 and therefore we have a further 
reflection of ubuntu intended here. 
 
It seems therefore that there is a tenuous link between conscience, as we 
have defined and discussed it above, and ubuntu, albeit that the reflection 
here is on a very dark mirror. 
 
 
Inclusivity 
Inclusivity, in King III terms, has to do with involving or considering the 
interests of all stakeholders, which must be taken into account in decision-
making.  Stakeholders were discussed in detail above and the conclusion 
was that the concept of stakeholders was very much in line with the people, 
the community, the group in my ubuntu principle, and, in my opinion, the 
stakeholder dimension does not warrant further elaboration or discussion.   
 
                                                     
30
 See for example Lange (1995) and similar cases. 
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Now, one would automatically suppose that inclusivity is an essential 
element of ubuntu.  The concepts of cohesion, reciprocal value and 
relationships in our ubuntu principle are all dependent on everyone being 
included in all actions.  However, King III does not say that everyone must 
be included in the decision-making process.  It says that all stakeholders’ 
legitimate interests must be taken into account.  That is King III’s intention, 
and a different matter altogether.  In and of itself the concept seems 
reasonably clear and one might be tempted to accept that by considering 
all stakeholders’ legitimate interests we would be promoting cohesion 
amongst or within groups. 
 
However, there is an inherent problem with this as it stands.  For example, 
Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) is currently set on open cast mining coal near 
the Mapungubwe National Park.  The web site of the Save Mapungubwe 
organisation, affiliated to the Endangered Wildlife Trust, has the following 
story on its first page:  
Our treasured World Heritage Site is under severe threat.  An 
Australian company, Coal of Africa Limited (CoAL) has recently been 
given the go ahead to begin construction of an opencast and 
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underground coal mine within less than 6km from the borders of the 
Mapungubwe National Park and adjacent to the World Heritage Site, 
with the approval of the Environmental Management Plan for the 
proposed Vele Colliery.  This will compromise the environmental 
integrity of the area in and around Mapungubwe for current and 
future generations as it relates to the natural habitat, ecosystems, 
cultural heritage and related aspects of the environment. 
 
The Corporate Social Responsibility page on the CoAL web site has the 
following quote, inter alia: 
Coal of Africa Ltd (‘CoAL’) is a coal mining and development company 
operating in South Africa.  CoAL is committed to various measures to 
mitigate any impact the Company’s operations may have on the 
environment.  We believe the future of mining depends on the 
industry’s capacity to maintain a balance between profitability and 
preservation of new environments, human capital and the 
surrounding communities.  (Coal of Africa, 2011) 
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Both the company and the environmental group believe they are right.  
Whose legitimate expectations are we to consider as paramount – the 
shareholders, the employees and management of the company, the board 
of directors or the environmental group?  Whatever happens in this 
situation is likely to damage relationships and thus, albeit that CoAL would 
argue that they are compliant with King III, there is certainly a clash with 
the ethos of ubuntu. 
 
An interesting observation is that Coal of Africa Limited is in fact an 
Australian listed company.  The Australian “equivalent” of King III, Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations in an similar section states 
that companies must “comply with their legal obligations and have regard 
to the reasonable expectations of their stakeholders (emphasis added)” 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2010, P22).  There is a big difference 
between legitimate and reasonable and, while CoAL would argue that they 
comply with the governance of their predominant domicile, it does not 
remove the governance problems that CoAL faces in mining Mapungubwe.   
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Therefore, while superficially inclusivity seems reflective of ubuntu, there 
are certainly many situations where compliance with King III will not 
necessarily promote cohesion and reciprocal value and may well damage 
relationships, and thus inclusivity, as interpreted by King III does not 
necessarily find expression in ubuntu.   
 
Is that a fair assessment?  How would an ubuntu-based community face 
such a situation?  Surely, the process would be to work together to 
minimise damage to the community or group relationships and to build 
cohesion?  How would King III address this?  In the definition of “inclusivity” 
King III states that “Inclusivity of stakeholders is essential to achieving 
sustainability and the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders 
must be taken into account in decision-making and strategy” (King III, p22).  
In discussing Principle 1.2 on corporate citizenship (pp22-24), King III is at 
pains to stress the importance of the social and economic environment.  
The example above would be answered by Point 18 “It is unethical for 
companies to expect society and future generations to carry the economic 
social and environmental costs and burdens of its operations…… a company 
itself should ensure that its impact on the economy, society and the natural 
101 
 
environment is sustainable."  Moreover, there is substantially more in the 
same vein.  Certainly, therefore, King III's views on corporate citizenship 
reflect a strong ubuntu approach to relationships with outside stakeholders. 
 
That still does not specifically address the myriad possible conflicts between 
internal stakeholders, such as wage negotiations between management and 
unions.  Nonetheless, if we consider that inclusivity means that "the 
legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders must be taken into 
account in decision-making" (p 22) then the onus is on management and 
the board to try to incorporate interests and expectations in all decision 
making.  King III specifically states that it: 
… opts for an inclusive stakeholder model of governance which 
considers, weighs and promotes the interests of the company’s 
stakeholders, thus ensuring the cooperation and support of all 
stakeholders the company depends on for its sustainable success.  In 
this way the company creates trust between itself and its extent 
internal and external stakeholders, without whom no company can 
operate sustainably." 
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Furthermore, as discussed in the section on “Fairness” above, it is definitely 
apparent that King III, as far as possible, wishes to be inclusive of all 
stakeholders in its deliberations and decision-making. 
 
It is impossible to conceive of any institution where there is no potential for 
conflict between interested parties.  However it appears that King III is 
certainly making an effort to minimise the damage that such conflicts may 
bring and accordingly with finds expression in ubuntu. 
 
 
Competence 
How does competence constitute a moral principle?  One could argue that 
competence is a basic requirement to be employed or to be in business.  It 
is a sine qua non.  Point 17 in the chapter on boards and directors has the 
following to say about directors: 
Directors of companies are appointed in terms of the Constitution of 
the company and in terms of the Act.  Each director of the company 
has a duty to exercise the degree of care skill and diligence that 
would be exercised by a reasonably diligent individual who has the 
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general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of an individual carrying out the same functions as a carried 
out by director in relation to the company; and the general 
knowledge, skill and experience of that director.  (King III, p32). 
While this section refers specifically to boards of directors, King III 
elsewhere states that "Although the terms company, boards and directors 
are used.  King III refers and applies to the functional responsibility of those 
charged with governance in any entity even if different terminologies used 
in other entities sectors and industries."  (King III, p17).  It therefore seems 
reasonable to assume that the characteristics of a competent director as 
listed above would apply equally to management and anyone else in 
positions of authority within the company. 
 
I still cannot see how competence, per se, can be a moral principle.  King III 
states that “The board should ascertain whether potential candidates are 
competent to be appointed as directors and can contribute to the business 
judgement calls to be made by the board.  In looking at the skills and 
suitability of a proposed candidate director there are three dimensions that 
require consideration, namely: the knowledge and experience required to 
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fill the gap on the board; the apparent integrity of the individual; and the 
skills and capacity of the individual to discharge his duties to the board."  
(King III, p41).  This does not help in considering whether competence is a 
moral value. 
 
We are thus left with the need to decide whether "general knowledge, skill 
and experience" or any other view of "competence" finds expression in 
ubuntu.  It appears that it is from the negative requirements of the principle 
that ubuntu can validate this principle.  An action is wrong if it damages 
relationships.  Incompetence, in any area of a business, must have a 
negative effect on the people affected by incompetent actions or managers 
/ directors.  Incompetence therefore causes damage to the relationships 
between people, and one can imagine many situations where the 
incompetence of an individual can negatively affect the relationship 
between a company and an individual – as a customer, an employee, a 
supplier, and, in fact, all stakeholders.  Incompetence can lose customers, 
thereby endangering jobs; incompetence can cause accidents leading to 
death or long-term physical damage; incompetence can lead to 
inefficiencies and time delays, which impact the lives of other people; 
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incompetence leads to frustration and anger.  In fact, as Haw (2011) 
observes: “experts agree that emotional stress — the kind that arises from 
working with idiots — can contribute to the development of heart disease 
and precipitate acute cardiac problems in people who already have heart 
disease.” 
 
Therefore, the competence of the individuals on the board or in 
management (the focus of the requirement) can directly affect relationships 
with stakeholders and is thus necessary in order to meet the requirements 
of ubuntu.  I must observe, however, that this is a torturous argument, 
albeit that I can understand why competence is an important characteristic 
and that, at an intuitive level, it is an “ubuntu-like” characteristic. 
 
 
Commitment 
For any ethical system to operate effectively there has to be commitment 
from all the people involved in implementing and living the system.  What is 
the commitment to?  King III's requirement is that directors should be 
diligent in performing their duties and should devote sufficient time to 
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company affairs.  (King III, p 22).  There is also provision for a performance 
review of directors, which requires the director’s contribution to be 
measured against his assigned duties, with reappointment only possible 
after an evaluation of the performance and attendance of the director.  
(King III, p45). 
 
Reading through the duties expected of directors in terms of King III it is 
apparent that a director could not meet his obligations, both in terms of 
King III and the Companies Act, unless he were committed.  It is just not 
feasible.  Of course, whether this is a moral duty is another question.   
 
I think there are several elements to be considered further.  In the first 
instance, a director should not make the commitment to be a director 
unless he were to live by the actual duties and responsibilities attached to 
the position.  To that extent, commitment is a moral duty.  Furthermore, 
one could have the same type of discussion as above with regard to 
conscience and use the same arguments to accept that there is a taste of 
ubuntu in commitment.  Secondly, there is the commitment to the 
principles, to the moral values and duties of King III itself.  Again, 
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commitment to the principles is very much the same as acting with 
conscience, as discussed above.  Finally, a director has a commitment to the 
company and its various stakeholders.  Commitment to stakeholders is 
necessary if the company, its managers and directors are to act in a moral 
or ethical way or, for our purposes, to act in accordance with the principle 
of ubuntu.   
 
Again, I am left with the concern that commitment is an ubuntu-like 
principle, but does not specifically find expression in the concept of ubuntu. 
 
 
Courage 
The final “moral value” in King III is courage.  It seems that what is intended 
by the code is the necessity for the various actors within the company and 
its stakeholder groups to be resolute in applying the moral values and 
ethical principles as laid out in the code.  King III refers to “the courage to 
act with integrity in all board decisions and activities”.  (King III, p22).  There 
is also the requirement that directors have the courage to take the 
necessary risks to direct and control the company’s activities. 
108 
 
 
It really is not possible to argue that this “value” is an expression of an 
ubuntu action-guiding principle.  It is just an exhortation to be courageous 
in behaving in the manner required by King III and thus exhibiting ubuntu, 
or any other ethical theory, for that matter. 
 
This concludes the discussion on the various elements of the King III 
heuristic and whether they are indeed based on the moral duties that find 
expression in the concept of ubuntu.  The next section concludes the 
research. 
 
109 
 
Section 5 
CONCLUSION 
Acceptance of the King III Report on Governance 2009 by all South Africans 
is imperative if good governance is to become the basis on which business 
is conducted.  To the extent that ubuntu is regarded as an important ethical 
concept by the majority of South Africans, the fact that King III does reflect 
the principles of ubuntu should lead to its acceptance and application by 
the greater part of the stakeholders affected by King III. 
 
In order to establish whether the ethical and moral duties and values as laid 
down in the King III Code actually do reflect the ethical values of ubuntu, 
over the course of this report I have looked at ubuntu and shown that 
ubuntu is a normative ethical theory.  I arrived at the ubuntu-based action-
guiding principle that: “An action is right insofar as it promotes cohesion 
and reciprocal value amongst people.  An action is wrong insofar as it 
damages relationships and devalues any individual or group.” 
 
I discussed the concept of ethical and moral duties as expressed in The King 
III Report on Corporate Governance and tried to ascertain whether they are 
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actually duties or principles.  I established that there appears to be some 
confusion in King III as to the philosophical difference between duties, 
values and principles and accepted that, nonetheless, the spirit or intention 
behind King III allows us to develop a heuristic for deciding whether actions 
and behaviours exhibited by the company, its managers and directors 
comply with the intention of King III.  Due to the numerous references to 
stakeholders, I considered the concept of stakeholders and their relevance 
to King III.  I showed that ubuntu can provide a normative business ethical 
base for stakeholder theory, and, more importantly, showed that 
stakeholder theory could find expression in the concept of ubuntu. 
 
I then created a heuristic or rule of thumb based on the ethical values and 
moral duties in King III and which could be used to apply King III.  The 
elements of the heuristic are responsibility, accountability, fairness, 
transparency, conscience, inclusivity, competence, commitment and 
courage.  These were then examined individually and I conclude that these 
elements do largely find expression in the ethical values of ubuntu, even if 
at times the fog caused by unsuitable terminology gave rise to some 
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torturous argument and although I could not find explicit expression of 
ubuntu in the elements of competence, commitment and courage. 
 
Nonetheless, everything I have read about ubuntu and all that is contained 
in King III leads me to one conclusion.  No matter the problems with 
terminology, the struggles with ethical theory, the difficulties in structuring 
a principle of right action, one overriding impression comes through – the 
Four Ethical Values and Five Moral Principles, as well as the Stakeholder 
requirements of King III incorporate and reflect the spirit of ubuntu, if not 
the letter. 
 
I thus feel confident in stating that I have achieved the two objectives of 
this report, namely:   
 determining that ubuntu can provide an acceptable normative ethical 
framework from which to evaluate Corporate Governance principles; 
and  
 establishing that the ethical and moral duties and values as laid down 
in the King III actually do find expression in the ethical values of 
ubuntu. 
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 Section 6 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
This report raised a number of issues that could be the focus of further 
research.   
 
The first has to do with the concept of ubuntu, and further areas for 
investigation would include determining what the people, the practitioners 
of ubuntu, actually consider the term to mean. 
 
It would be of interest to explore the scope of ubuntu and the meaning of 
community.  Is it the local village, or a tribe, the population of a district or 
country, or does it include all humanity? 
 
The terms used in this report were value, worth, dignity and good will.  
These are largely Kantian in origin.  The questions to be resolved include: 
what is the correct word to use, with all its connotations; and is there a 
non-Kantian approach that could be used?  The approach adopted in 
determining a maxim for ubuntu was deontological by its very nature and it 
would be interesting to consider a more consequentialist or liberal view. 
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Despite a substantial body of literature, it seems that Stakeholder Theory 
requires a review and a more formal structure.  Investigation could be into 
whether my concept of a split between normative theory and practical 
participant identification is correct, or is the theory itself a normative 
ethical business theory.  Other avenues include stakeholder identification 
and determination of the moral basis for their claims against the company. 
 
Finally, there is enormous scope for investigating and determining the 
ethical values and moral principles that should guide a company.  King III 
seems to fall short in this area, either by not defining exactly what was 
meant by the terms, or by not being as careful in their selection as they 
could have been.  There is a great deal of literature and many textbooks on 
business ethics, but this is an aspect that warrants clarification. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
EXTRACT FROM THE KING CODE OF GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
2009 
 
Governance 
element 
Principles Recommended Practice 
1  Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 
Responsible 
leadership 
1.1 The board should 
provide effective 
leadership based on 
an ethical foundation 
Ethical leaders should: 
1.1.1 direct the strategy and operations 
to build a sustainable business 
1.1.2 consider the short- and long-term 
impacts of the strategy on the 
economy, society and the 
environment; 
1.1.3 do business ethically; 
1.1.4 do not compromise the natural 
environment; and 
1.1.5 take account of the company’s 
impact on internal and external 
stakeholders. 
The board’s 
res-
ponsibilities 
 The board should: 
1.1.6 be responsible for the strategic 
direction of the company and the 
control; of the company; 
1.1.7 set the values to which the 
company will adhere formulated in 
its code of conduct; 
1.1.8 ensure that its conduct and that of 
management aligns to the values 
and is adhered to in all aspects of 
its business; and 
1.1.9 promote the stakeholder-inclusive 
approach of governance. 
Ethical 
foundation 
 The board should: 
1.1.10 ensure that all deliberations, 
decisions and actions are based on 
the four values underpinning good 
governance; and 
1.1.11 ensure that each director adheres 
to the duties of a director 
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Governance 
element 
Principles Recommended Practice 
 1.2  The board should 
ensure that the company is 
and is seen to be a 
responsible corporate 
citizen 
The board should: 
1.1.1 consider not only on financial 
performance but also the impact of 
the company’s operations on 
society and the environment 
1.1.2 protect, enhance and invest in the 
well-being of the economy, society 
and the environment; 
1.1.3 Ensure that the company’s 
performance  and interaction with 
its stakeholders is guided by the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights; 
1.1.4 Ensure that collaborative efforts 
with stakeholders are embarked 
upon to promote ethical conduct 
and good corporate citizenship; 
1.1.5 Ensure that measurable corporate 
citizenship programmes are 
implemented; and 
1.1.6 Ensure that management develops 
corporate citizenship policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3 The board should 
ensure that the 
company’s ethics are 
managed effectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The board should ensure that: 
1.3.1  it builds and sustains an ethical 
corporate culture in the company; 
1.3.2 it determines the ethical standards 
which should be clearly articulated 
and ensures that the company 
takes measures to achieve 
adherence to them in all aspects of 
its business; 
1.3.3 adherence to ethical standards is 
measured; 
1.3.4 internal and external ethics 
performance is aligned around the 
same ethical standards; 
1.3.5 ethical risks and opportunities are 
incorporated in the risk 
management process; 
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Governance 
element 
Principles Recommended Practice 
  1.3.6 a code of conduct and ethics-
related policies are implemented; 
1.3.7 compliance with the code of 
conduct is integrated in the 
operations of the company; and 
the company’s ethics performance 
should be assessed, monitored, 
reported and disclosed. 
2.  Boards and directors 
Role and 
function of the 
board 
2.1  The board should act as 
the focal point for and 
custodian of corporate 
governance 
The board should: 
2.1.3 monitor the relationship between 
management and the stakeholders 
of the company; and 
2.1.4 ensure that the company survives 
and thrives. 
 2.2  The board should 
appreciate that strategy, 
risk, performance and 
sustainability are 
inseparable 
2.1.4 ensure that the strategy will result 
in sustainable outcomes taking 
account of people, planet and 
profit. 
 2.14 2.14.1 The board must act in the best 
interests of the company. 
2.14.2 Directors must adhere to the legal 
standards of conduct. 
6.  Compliance with laws, rules, codes and standards 
 6.1  The board should 
ensure that the company 
complies with applicable 
laws and considers 
adherence to non-binding 
rules, codes and standards 
6.1.1 Companies must comply with all 
applicable laws. 
6.1.2 Exceptions permitted in law, 
shortcomings and proposed 
changes expected should be 
handled ethically. 
6.1.3 Compliance should be an ethical 
imperative. 
6.1.4 Compliance with applicable laws 
should be understood not only in 
terms of the obligations they 
create but also for the rights and 
protection they afford. 
 
 
 
117 
 
Governance 
element 
Principles Recommended Practice 
  6.1.5 The board should understand the 
context of the law, and how other 
applicable laws interact with it. 
6.1.6 The board should monitor the 
company’s compliance with 
applicable laws, rules, codes and 
standards. 
6.1.7 Compliance should be a regular 
item on the agenda of the board. 
6.1.8 The board should disclose details in 
the integrated report on how it 
discharged its responsibility to 
establish an effective compliance 
framework and processes. 
8.  Governing stakeholder relationships 
 8.1  The board should 
appreciate that 
stakeholders’ perceptions 
affect a company’s 
reputation 
8.1.1 The gap between stakeholder 
perceptions and the performance 
of the company should be 
managed and measured to 
enhance or protect the company’s 
reputation. 
8.1.2 The company’s reputation and its 
linkage with stakeholder 
relationships should be a regular 
board agenda item. 
8.1.3 The board should identify 
important stakeholder groupings. 
 8.2  The board should 
delegate to management to 
proactively deal with 
stakeholder relationships 
8.2.1 Management should develop a 
strategy and formulate policies for 
the management of relationships 
with each stakeholder grouping. 
8.2.2 The board should consider 
whether it is appropriate to publish 
its stakeholder policies. 
8.2.3 The board should oversee 
mechanisms and processes that 
support stakeholders in 
constructive engagement with the 
company. 
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Governance 
element 
Principles Recommended Practice 
  8.2.4 The board should encourage 
shareholders to attend AGM’s. 
8.2.5 The board should consider not only 
formal but also informal processes 
for interaction with the company’s 
stakeholders. 
8.2.6 The board should disclose in its 
integrated report the nature of the 
company’s dealings with 
stakeholders and the outcomes of 
these dealings. 
 8.3 The board should strive 
to achieve the appropriate 
balance between its various 
stakeholder groupings, in 
the best interests of the 
company. 
8.3.1 The board should take account of 
the legitimate interests and 
expectations of its stakeholders in 
its decision making in the best 
interests of the company 
 8.4 Companies should 
ensure the equitable 
treatment of shareholders. 
8.4.1 There must be equitable treatment 
of all holders of the same class of 
shares issued. 
8.4.2 The board should ensure that 
minority shareholders are 
protected. 
 8.5 Transparent and 
effective communication 
with stakeholders is 
essential for building and 
maintaining their trust and 
confidence. 
8.5.1 Complete, timely, relevant, 
accurate, honest and accessible 
information should be provided by 
the company to its stakeholders 
while having regard to legal and 
strategic considerations. 
8.5.2 Communication with stakeholders 
should be in clear and 
understandable language. 
8.5.3 The board should adopt 
communication guidelines that 
support a responsible 
communication programme. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
COMMON DEFINITIONS OF VALUES AND VALUE SYSTEMS 
 
Author(s) Definition 
C. Kluckhohn,  
1951, p.395 
A conception, explicit or implicit . . . of the desirable 
which influences the selection from among available 
modes, means, and ends of action. 
Guth & Tagiuri, 
1965, pp. 124-125 
A value can be viewed as a conception, explicit or 
implicit, of what an individual or a group regards as 
desirable, and in terms of which he or they select, from 
among alternative available modes, the means and 
ends of action. 
Senger, 
1971, p. 416 
A personal value structure “is a hierarchy of 
competing, fundamental life directions which act as 
criteria for psychological behaviour.” 
Sikula,  
1971, p. 281 
Personal value system as “a set of individual values 
that exist in a scale of hierarchy that reveals their 
degree of importance.  Individuals may all possess the 
same set of values but attach different priorities or 
degree of importance to them.” 
Rotech,  
1973, p. 5 
A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence is personally or 
socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence. 
Conner & Becker, 
1975, p. 551 
Values may be thought of as global beliefs about 
desirable end- states underlying attitudinal and 
behavioural processes. 
Hofstede, 
1980, p. 19 
A broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs 
over others 
Ravlin & Meglino, 
1987a, p. 667 
Social values . . . represent general modes of behaviour 
individuals should or ought to exhibit. 
Enz, 
1988, p. 287 
Organizational values are defined as the beliefs held by 
an individual or group regarding means and ends 
organizations “ought to” or “should” identify in the 
running of the enterprise, in choosing what business 
actions or objectives are preferable to alternative 
actions, or in establishing organizational objectives. 
Hambrick & Brandon, 
1988, p. 5  
A broad and relatively enduring preference for some 
state of affairs. 
 
Source: Agle & Caldwell, (1999) Table 8, page 362 
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